THE

REFLECTIONS

ON THE

XXVIII PROPOSITIONS

TOUCHING THE

DOCTRINE

OF THE

TRINITY,

In a LETTER to the Clergy, *&c.* maintain'd, againſt the *Third Defence* of the ſaid Propoſitions.

By the ſame Hand. Mat. Tindal

1 Tim. 2. 5. *For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and Men, the Man Chriſt Jeſus.*

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The REFLECTIONS *upon the* XXVIII PROPOSITIONS, *&c. maintain'd.*

THough there is nothing in the third Defence of the 28 Propoſitions, *&c.* that can (as far as I can perceive) enervate the leaſt Objection that is urged in my Letter; yet becauſe the Doctrine therein maintained tends to ſubvert the Foundation of the Chriſtian Religion, by introducing a Plurality of Gods, I cannot but think my ſelf in Conſcience oblig'd to ſhew the Vanity of thoſe Pretences that are urg'd in its behalf, eſpecially ſince the Defender's writing with ſo great an Aſſurance of his own Performance, and ſo much contempt of the Reflections, may have ſome influence upon ſome weak and prejudiced Readers.

Had the Author deſign'd a juſt Defence of the Doctrine of the Trinity, he ſhould have taken notice of what is ſaid againſt it in general, but more eſpecially of what is urged againſt the real Trinitarians, wherein he is equally concerned with them, and not only of thoſe additional Abſurdities of his own Hypotheſis. Therefore I ſhall now ſet down his Opinion, both as I find it in his Propoſitions, and in the Defences of them, and then ſhew the weakneſs of his Notions, either with new Arguments, or at leaſt with enforcing thoſe that were mentioned in my Reflections.

The Defender in his Propoſitions aſſerts, "That there are three Eter- "nal and neceſſary Divine Beings or "Subſtances, each of which has un- "limited Power, Wiſdom and Good- "neſs; and that ſo many Men or "Angels are not more expreſly di- "ſtinguiſhed in Scripture, as different "Perſons or Subſtances, *Prop.* 16, "17. And *pag.* 8. *of the ſecond De-* "*fence*; I do affirm the Son and Spi- "rit to be abſolutely perfect Beings, "in reference to the Perfections of "their Nature, they are all boundleſs "and Infinite; So *pag.* 10. The Fa- "ther's Exiſtence being without a "Cauſe, does not make him to have "another ſort of Nature from that "of the Son and Spirit, which may "be a neceſſary Nature and uncreated, "and conſtituted of all the boundleſs "Perfections of which the Nature of "the Father conſiſts, abſtracted from "the conſideration of the manner "of his Exiſtence: *and in the ſame*

" *Page*, The Divine Nature (ſpeak-
" ing of the Nature of each) doth
" comprehend all Perfections. So
" *pag.* 11. An Eſſence of the ſame
" Kind, though not the ſame nume-
" rical One. So that here are three divine eternal neceſſary Natures or Eſſences, as different as three Human or Angelical Natures; which at firſt ſight appear as much to be three Gods as three human Natures to be three Men; which is a revolting to Polytheiſm or Plurality of Gods, except he can ſhew that either two of theſe Divine Natures are not Gods, or that theſe three Divine Natures are but one God. We will therefore ſee what he ſaith to theſe two Points.

1. He ſays, that the Name of *God* is uſed in more ſenſes than one in Scripture. In the higheſt Senſe the Father alone is God; he is the only Independent, the only True, the only Good and Great, and Self-exiſtent God. The Son and Spirit have a right to the Name of God, next to that which is appropriated to the Father; they depend on him with an entire dependance, both for their Being and continuance in Being. But is not this inconſiſtent with what is ſaid before, becauſe it is firſt to aſſert, that the different Ways or Manners of having their Natures does not make any difference in their Natures, the ſecond and third are as truly Divine as the Firſt; and then in effect to ſuppoſe it does, becauſe the Father has ſeveral Perfections the others are uncapable of? To this he replies, the Perfections the Father has above them belong immediately to his Exiſtence, not to his Nature: but what is Exiſtence abſtracted from the Nature that exiſts, but a Chimera? If the Nature did not exiſt, it would not be a Nature. To ſay ſuch a Nature exiſts, is to ſay, it is not only in our imagination, but really or in act: To make the Exiſtence of a Nature a diſtinct thing from the Nature that exiſts, and to ſuppoſe it to be the Subject in which the Attributes or Perfections of Independance, and being the firſt Original of all things, do exiſt, is to ſuppoſe it a Subſtance, becauſe we have no other Idea of a Subſtance, but that it is a Subject in which Properties exiſt, which would be to make two diſtinct Subſtances in God; his Nature that exiſts, and the Exiſtence of his Nature abſtracted from the Nature. What is the Exiſtence of God the Father, but the Exiſtence of the Nature of God the Father, except he exiſts diſtinct from his Nature? And conſequently, if Self-exiſtence be ſo great a Perfection, it ſheweth that the ſelf-exiſtent Nature of the Father is more perfect than the not ſelf-exiſtent Nature of the Son.

But ſuppoſe Self-exiſtence, which is Exiſtence of the Father, belongs to the Exiſtence of the Father, (which by the way is only ſuppoſing Exiſtence to belong to Exiſtence); yet Self-exiſtence, as I obſerved in my Letter, is only a Perfection as it ſuppoſeth neceſſary

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or independant Existence, and all those Perfections that belong to a necessary or self-existent Nature: so that Self-existence barely considered in it self, abstractedly from those Perfections, notwithstanding his denial, is no more a Perfection than any other way of having Existence, if that way supposeth the same Perfections. As suppose there was some Matter self-existent, and some other Matter not self-existent, and the Nature of the one were not any way different from the Nature of the other, would they not be both equally Perfect? and a parcel of Guinea's made of the One, be as good as a parcel of Guinea's made of the other? Or how could it be possible (they being alike for Weight, Colour, Duration, *&c.*) to distinguish them? And if it be so in lower Natures, the reason is the same in the highest Natures. But however, to carry the Simily as high as we can: suppose a Human self-existent Father had two Sons, who had all the Perfections of Human Nature, and did as necessarily and independently exist as He; there can be no reason assigned, but that they would be Men in the highest Sense, and as absolutely perfect as the Father. He saith, in *pag.* 44. of the first Defence, That *if a Human Father could be suppos'd to be Self-existent, and that his Sons had the now mentioned kind of Dependance upon him,* (viz. *as the Light on the Sun*) *the consequence must be, that their Nature is short of the Perfection of their Father's Nature, notwithstanding the many Properties they agree in:* which is owning, that Self-existence and Independence belong to the *Nature*, and that therefore the *Nature* of the Father is different from the *Nature* of the Son and Spirit, whose Natures are short of the Perfections of the Father's Nature, and consequently their Natures are not Divine, because the Divine Nature contains all Perfections; but theirs want those that not only in themselves are the greatest and most excellent, but the want of which is (as he saith *pag.* 7.) an abatement of all other Perfections: And if the Father's Nature is independent, and the Son's and Spirit's dependent, it shews they have different kinds of Nature, as different, nay as opposite as Dependent and Independent.

But what can be a more staring Contradiction, than that Beings that do eternally and necessarily exist, and are Almighty, yet notwithstanding this have not a Power to keep themselves in Life and Being, no not a Moment, and yet at the same time have a Power inherent in themselves from all Eternity, to give Life and Being to all things whatever; which also do entirely depend on them for the continuation of the same? It is a contradiction to say a necessary Nature is dependent, because a necessary Nature is that Nature which contains in it self the formal Reason why it cannot but be: but a dependent Nature

ture is so far from having any thing in it self that makes it necessarily exist, that it not only owes to another its Existence, but hourly depends upon another (having no Power in its self) to continue it in Existence; which is the dependence of a Creature, not of a Creator: Is not a *dependent* Creator as great a Contradiction as an *independent* Creature? And did ever any but our Author join necessary Existence and Dependence together? How can they, as I intimated *Sect.* 62. having necessary Existence, be said more to depend on the Father for their *continuance* in Being, than the Father on them? since they as necessarily and as eternally exist as he, who can no more hinder *theirs*, than his own Existence; nor could he more forbear *emaning* them from all Eternity, than *existing* himself. And if his Existence was without a Cause, his emaning must be so too, since the one was as necessary and eternal as the other: In created Beings all necessary Emanations have the same cause as the Beings from whence they emane; but God having no Cause of his Being, his necessary Emanations must have no cause also. And consequently eternal and necessary Existence, as I observ'd in the same *Sect.* 62. is as great a Perfection as Self-existence, since one is without a Cause as much as the other; nay, there can be no difference between them; for if the Father is self-existent, the Emanations that *issue forth* from him must be so too, since they are emanatory Substances, which were not produced by the Will and Power of the Father from nothing, but they emaned from something; which since there was nothing else to emane from, must be the Father's self-existent Substance, to which it was essential to have Emanations, and consequently they have the same Existence as the Substance in which they existed when they emaned; nor could their emaning make them lose their Self-existence. But more of this hereafter.

But he says they depend on the Father *for the continuation of their Being, as the Streams on the Fountain, or the Rays on the Sun*; But there's no material Substance that depends upon another for its Existence or continuance in Existence; all Matter is equally old, and has subsisted ever since the Creation; and Generation and Corruption is nothing but Matter according to the Laws of Motion changing its Shapes and Figures: and therefore such Similies are not to the purpose, because we are not speaking of any supposed Form or Figure of the Son and Spirit, but of the Existence of their Substances, *viz.* whether they have them by any third way different from both Creation and Self-existence. As to the Streams depending on the Fountain, it is no more than this, that if the Water did not issue out of the Ground, it could not run along the Ground; if it did not bubble up in the Fountain, it could

could no more flow to the next Place, than if it ſtop'd *there* it could flow to a *third:* but this does not make one part of the Water give being to another part, or continue it in Being; it is the ſame Body of Water which was in the Fountain that is now in the Streams. And as to the Rays, they no way depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in Being, except the Sun by a creating Power makes them to exiſt, and by the ſame Power continues them in Exiſtence: If the Rays are (as ſome imagin) parts of the *Æther* ſet in motion by the Sun, they no more depend on the Sun for their Being or continuance in Being, than the Sun does on them; but if they emane from the Body of the Sun, they have the ſame cauſe of their Being and continuance in Being as the Sun it ſelf, becauſe they like unto all other neceſſary Emanations, were parts of the Body whence they emaned, and conſequently have the ſame Origin as the Sun it ſelf. And if the Sun had been ſelf-exiſtent, they, becauſe parts of it, would have been ſo too: nor would their emaning deſtroy their Self-exiſting, or any ways cauſe them then to depend on the Sun for their continuance in Being; ſince the leaſt Subſtance is as much a Subſtance as the greateſt, and conſequently equally able to ſubſiſt by it ſelf; ſo that notwithſtanding his altogether unlike Similes it's evident, if the Son and H. Spirit are Eternal and Neceſſary, they are as ſelf-exiſtent and independent as the Father; and conſequently Gods in as high a Senſe as he, who if he were not a neceſſary Being would not be independent nor ſelf-exiſtent, and conſequently thoſe three muſt go together: but if their Natures are dependent and not ſelf-exiſtent, they are ſo far from containing all Perfections, and being as truly Divine as the Father's, that they are truly created Natures, or from no-beings made to be, and like all ſuch Beings (as I obſerv'd *Sect.* 62.) *in God they live, and move, and have their Being.*

I ſaid *Sect.* 62. If the Perſons have the ſame unlimited Perfections, tho the manner of their getting them was different, this would not cauſe any inequality between them: to which he anſwers it would; that is, in reference to their manner of Exiſtence, though not in reference to their meer Eſſence. But if there is not only a different manner of their getting their Eſſences, but their Eſſences when gotten exiſt after a different manner, (which he muſt mean, or elſe contradict himſelf and agree with me) it's impoſſible they ſhould have the ſame kind of Nature, becauſe to exiſt is common to all Natures: it's the different manner of Exiſtence that makes the difference between Natures; and conſequently a Nature that has a more excellent manner of Exiſting, will be a more excellent kind of Nature. And therefore if the Natures of the Son and Spirit had not only a

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different way of having their Exiſtence, but do exiſt after a different manner; their Natures or Eſſences muſt be of different kinds or ſorts: But if they exiſt after the ſame manner, though they have different ways of coming by their Exiſtence, there can be no inequality or difference between them.

I asked *Sect.* 63. How the Father could be greater than the Son and Holy Spirit, and be the only Good when they have the ſame, that is, unlimited Power and Goodneſs: he anſwers, *they have unlimited Power, but not the ſame*, which is, ſince the Father's Power exceeds theirs, to ſuppoſe that there is ſome Bounds and Limits of their Power, and conſequently theirs is an *unlimited limited* Power and Goodneſs. He further adds, That the Son's Power is not as great as the Father's *ad intra*, becauſe he could not beget the Father, as the Father begat him: But it being a Contradiction to ſuppoſe the Son could beget the Father, and *Contradictions being* (as he obſerves, *pag.* 50.) *Objects of no Power*, cannot be Objects of Divine Power; therefore it could be no diminution to the Son's Greatneſs, that he could not beget the Father who always was in Being: though upon ſuppoſition that the Son always was in Being, it is equally a Contradiction to ſay, That the Father gave him a Being. But if it were an eſſential and neceſſary Perfection of the Father's Nature, to beget or emane two Sons, and the Son and Holy Spirit are not capable to emane Sons; it ſhows there is a mighty Difference in their Natures, or that they want ſome Perfections that is neceſſary and eſſential to the Nature of the Father, nay, *which belongs* (as he obſerves, *pag.* 13.) *to every Creature*, where he makes this remark, "That if there is not a Crea-" ture but can communicate his Na-" ture; what a Boldneſs is it to af-" firm, That the infinite Creator " cannot do the like? *He that hath* " *planted the Ear, ſhall he not hear?* " *and he that hath form'd the Eye,* " *ſhall he not ſee?* He that has given " a Generative Power to the meaneſt " of Creatures, ſhall he not have the " ſame Power himſelf? *&c.* So that by his Argument, to deny to the Son and Spirit a Power to multiply their Species as the Father does, is to deny to the infinite Creator (ſince each is the infinite Creator) a Perfection the meaneſt of Creatures have.

As to the Father's being called *the only Good* by our Saviour, *There is none good but God*; that *Phraſe* (ſays he) *ſignifies the Father's being the Original and Fountain of Goodneſs, which he may be, though not the only perfect Good:* He refers to *Grotius*, but *Grotius* ſpeaks of the Goodneſs of God, as the Fountain of Goodneſs in Creatures. But if the Streams be as perfectly good as the Fountain, it would be very falſe to ſay, the Fountain is the only Good. I ſhall only apply to himſelf, which he juſtly

(*Prop.*

(*Prop.* 11.) says concerning the other Trinitarians, *If such a Liberty as this in Interpreting Scripture be allowable, what Work may be made with Scripture?* Besides, if the Son and Spirit are, as he saith, necessary and eternal, they must be as much the Original and Fountain of Goodness, as the Father himself who is so, because he is the eternal and necessary Being.

The notion of Three necessary eternal Beings is in it self sufficiently absurd; for the meaning of a necessary eternal Being, is a Being which in the Nature of things, and our conceptions concerning them, could not but be or exist: it was impossible it should be otherwise, because it implies a contradiction that any Being or Person should now be, if either it had not been from all Eternity, or were not produced from that which was from Eternity; for of nothing comes nothing: but it was not necessary there should be more than one such Being, because one such Being, since he is all-sufficient, is in all Reason sufficient for it self and all other Beings whatever; and if one is sufficient, two or more cannot be necessary; for that implies this Contradiction, That one is sufficient and not sufficient, another is necessary where one is All-sufficient.

As the supposition of three necessary perfect Beings is in it self absurd, so it is more absurd to say, that two of these necessary perfect Beings want some Perfections; because necessary perfect Beings cannot want any Perfections. There was, 'tis true, an eternal necessity that some Being should exist of it self, or without a Cause, and have all Perfections; yet there could not be any necessity of another Being which should want any of those Perfections the first had; for it is as much as to say, that it was eternally necessary there should exist a Being in some respects imperfect, that is, an imperfect God; nay, not only imperfect, but useless and superfluous. And therefore it must be absurd to suppose it should be necessary and essential to the Divine Nature of the Father, to have two Natures to emane from him, which though they are supposed to be each Almighty and All-sufficient, yet must be as needless to himself or to any Creation, as he is All-sufficient for both; and who can serve for no other end, than to rob Him of that Honour, Power, Dominion, Glory, Praise, Adoration, Love, *&c.* which without those Emanations he would wholly enjoy to himself, and which he can now only share with two others; so that nothing can be a wilder Notion, than of one God emaning two Gods.

If it be not contrary to Reason there should be more than one necessary Divine Nature; I demand a Reason why the Heathens were blam'd for believing a Plurality of such, since there can be no reason assign'd for above one, which will not equally hold for as many or more than they worshipped; all which but one they supposed were not self-existent, but emaned Gods. And if they were without excuse for worshipping more

than one God, it must be plain by the Light of Nature what that one God is; otherwise the generality of Mankind could not distinguish between Theism and Polytheism. And does not the Light of Nature demonstrate, that one God is but one eternal necessary Being? And can it be suppos'd that the Scripture should so severely condemn the Heathens as sinning against the clearest Light of Nature, in adoring more than one; and at the same time require the Christians upon pain of eternal Damnation, to worship three eternal necessary Natures? which is to make the Holy Scripture to contradict not only the Light of Nature, but it self; and let him if he can produce any one Argument against a plurality of Gods, which will not equally hold against a plurality of Divine Natures. There are none that have wrote against Heathenism, but have thought the Impossibility of more than one necessary Nature, a Demonstration against the Plurality of Gods; and consequently they suppos'd it most evident, that there can be no more but one such Nature, because they use it as a Medium (which ought always to be clearer than that which is prov'd by it) to prove the Existence of but one God.

I shall only instance one Authority which may be *instar omnium*, and that is *Grotius de verit. relig. Christ. The first Attribute of God* (saith he in the beginning of that excellent Book) *is, that he is one God and no more. This is thence collected, that he is that Being which is necessarily and by himself; for whatsoever is necessarily or by it self, is not considered in Kind, but as it is in Act: but if you suppose more Gods, then you will find nothing in each of them, why any of them should necessarily be, and no reason why there should be rather two than three, or ten than five: Add hereunto, that the multiplicity of singular things of the same kind, proceeds from the fecundity of Causes, by reason of which fewer or more things are brought forth; but God has no Origin nor Cause.* So that this great Man is contrary to our Author in every thing. 1. In supposing it impossible there should be more than one necessary Being. 2. That more than one such necessary Being would infer more than one God; and that God could not out of the Fecundity of Causes multiply his Kind. 3. Whatever had a Cause or Origin, could not be God. 4. That there is no difference between necessary Being, or Being by it self, or without a Cause; they are really one and the same with Him, and so they are with all that have writ on this Subject: They suppose God self-existent or without a Cause, because he is necessary and eternal. They never make use of our Author's admirable distinction, *pag.* 50. *of having necessary Existence from another, and necessary Existence from one's self.*

He asks me *pag.* 48. whether *I think that God can be the necessary Cause of nothing; or whether the Perfection of his Nature does not determin Him to do what is best, or to do what he*

he in his infinite Wiſdom knows fit to be done? To which I anſwer, That the Queſtion between us is not what the Perfection of his Nature doth determin him to; but what the Perfection of his Nature is? whether three perfect neceſſary Natures or one only? which is queſtioning whether the Unity of God be a Perfection or not. Whatſoever is neceſſarily in God muſt contain the higheſt Perfection, otherwiſe it would not be eſſential to his Nature: but God being in his own numerically one Nature, abſolutely and infinitely Happy and Perfect, two other Divine Natures cannot be in Him, or (which is all one with our Author) emane from him neceſſarily, becauſe they can add no Perfection great or little to Him, who in his *one* Nature contains all Perfections whatever. He and they together can be no more Good, Powerful, Wiſe, than he is alone: He alone is All-ſufficient, and two other ſuch Natures can make him no more. Therefore it muſt be directly contrary to the Nature of God and highly injurious to his Honour, to ſuppoſe his Nature neceſſarily to emane two Perſons, who muſt be needleſs *ad intra* to God himſelf, and as uſeleſs *ad extra* as God himſelf is All-ſufficient. But if God gave a Being freely to the Son and Holy Spirit, becauſe he in his infinite Wiſdom knew it fit to be done, they are no more neceſſary Beings than all other Beings which God alſo produced, becauſe he in his infinite Wiſdom knew it fit to be done, or that the Perfection of his Nature did determin him to what was beſt; and conſequently they as all others continue in Being, becauſe God's Wiſdom thinks it beſt. But to ſay that God acted otherways than ſo, that is neceſſarily, in producing or cauſing the Son and Holy Spirit to exiſt, who are as diſtinct and diffirent from Him as two Men are from all other Men, is either to make him act without underſtanding, or elſe to act contrary to his Mind: for Neceſſity only takes Place where Thoughts are wholly wanting, or elſe the Power to act or forbear acting according to the Direction of Thought. But if God did not give them their Beings, neither as neceſſitated, nor becauſe he in his Wiſdom thought fit, (which our Author calls *neceſſarily*) he could not (there being no middle way) give them their Beings at all, or be the Original or Cauſe of them; and conſequently they having no Origin or Cauſe, muſt be as much without a Cauſe, or ſelf-exiſtent, as the Father: and the ſame neceſſity (if I may ſo ſay) that made the Father to exiſt, muſt make them exiſt. And the Father, upon ſuppoſition that they neceſſarily eman'd, can be no more the Original of them than of his own Nature, becauſe the ſame Neceſſity that made his Nature exiſt, made it emane: It was as eſſential to it to emane, as to exiſt; and conſequently the emaning Natures muſt be as ſelf-exiſtent, and independent as his own Nature, ſince they no more depend on him for Exiſtence, or continuance in Exiſtence, than his own Nature does. Which very thing would the Defender ſeriouſly conſider, it

would make him abate of his confidence in his Hypotheſis. But more of this hereafter.

2. Now I ſhall remind him, that tho the Deſign of his Propoſitions is to prove the Doctrine of the Trinity is not contradictory to natural Reaſon, yet they (as I obſerv'd, *Sect.* 64.) directly deſtroy the Unity of God, which is the ſecond Point I am to examine: and that we may be aſſured there are not three Perſons or Divine Natures in the Godhead, he affirms, *Prop.* 13. *That the Godhead, or GOD in the higheſt Senſe, can be but ONE NUMERICALLY, and therefore the Oneneſs ſo frequently affirmed of him in Scripture, is a numerical Oneneſs:* and in his Anſwer to the *Conſid.* (to which he refers me) he ſays *pag.* 23. *That the Name of GOD in Scripture is ever to be underſtood in the abſolutely higheſt Senſe.* How could an Unitarian in more direct Terms deny a Trinity? What he urges in behalf of the Trinity is *pag.* 17. where he ſays, *The Holy Scripture doth abundantly declare the Unity of God, but no where diſtinguiſheth of Unity, nor ſays of what Nature that Unity is which it aſcribes to God.* But is not this directly contradicting *Prop.* 13. where he declares of what Nature or ſort the Unity of God is, to wit, *a numerical Unity*; and *pag.* 22. That *the Name of God in Scripture is ever to be underſtood in that higheſt Senſe?* And indeed it had been very abſurd to ſuppoſe the Scripture did frequently inculcate that *God is one*, and yet not let us know in what Senſe he is one, except it be obvious to common Reaſon what that Oneneſs is, to wit, one eternal abſolutely perfect neceſſary Being. It's moſt certain that when we aſcribe any thing to God as a Perfection, we aſcribe it in the higheſt Senſe, and conſequently the Oneneſs of God muſt be taken in that Senſe. I deſire to know what will deſtroy the Unity of God, if every thing Treble in him will not do it, as three Natures with three unlimited Powers, Wiſdoms, Goodneſſes.

But he pleads, they are not three Gods, becauſe *there is an immediate Union in their ſpiritual Subſtances:* But I ſay, no Union whatever can make three, each of which is one God, to be but one God; becauſe it is firſt ſaying, each is one God, and then denying it by ſaying, all three are but *one God*; ſo that it cannot without a manifeſt Contradiction be ſaid, that while each remains one God, they can any way be united into one God: for three of the ſame kind will be thrice what one of the ſame kind is. If Union make them one God, it muſt either identify them by making them one and the ſame God; and conſequently there can be no real diſtinction between them, or it muſt make none of them God by making them parts of God, which by Union compoſe one God. For we have no other Idea of Compoſition, but of one thing being made up of ſeveral, which by being united conſtitute that one; and which whether material or immaterial we cannot conceive, but as parts of the thing they conſtitute. For ſince each is not the whole, it muſt be only a part of the

the whole, whatever our Author *pag.* 54. ſays to the contrary. I would willingly know why they are not as much three Gods, though ſuppos'd ſubſtantially united, as if they were not united, ſince each has in himſelf diſtinctly from the others all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, and they could have no more if they were ſeparate. It is as much Idolatry to adore three united as three ununited Gods, ſince in both Caſes you equally rob God of his Honour, by paying it to two numerically diverſe and different Gods: And being Subſtances, they are in their Natures capable of ſubſiſting apart from one another.

He *pag.* 53. miſrepreſents what I ſay concerning Union, as though I argued againſt the bare poſſibility of their being united, and not of their becoming *one God by Union*, while each remain'd God diſtinct from the others: and then makes a long Harangue about Myſtery, in which he ſays, if he do not *ſeriouſly* cry *Myſtery*, I *know what I know of him.*

But however to do him the fuller Juſtice, I will mention what he further ſays concerning this Union. In his firſt Defence, *pag.* 19. He ſaith, *They are as much one with one another, as they without the moſt apparent contradiction are capable of being one.* A Heathen would not have ſcrupled to have ſaid as much of his Gods. But he goes on and ſays, *They are much more than ſpecifically one:* but then it is evident they cannot be ſo much diſtinguiſhed as ſo many Men or Angels which are but ſpecifically one. But he will not allow that they are identified or numerically one, (*p.* 53.) but if we cannot apprehend any Medium between numerical and ſpecifical Oneneſs, then in profeſſing to believe it, we profeſs we know not what. But I ſuppoſe he will ſay at this turn, as he does in his *ſecond Defence*, pag. 26. *Well, ſuppoſe this! Is it impoſſible for a thing to be of which we ſorry Mortals have no Idea?* I ſay no, by no means; but with humble Submiſſion he's a very ſorry Mortal that requires us to believe Words without any Idea's annex'd to them. But let our Author ſay what he will, he has ſtill a Simily to help him out. This Medium between ſpecifick and numerical Unity, is as great a Unity as that between the Sun, its Splendour, and the Light of both: But thoſe muſt be either different or the ſame thing; if different, though of the ſame Kind, there can be but a ſpecifick Unity, or if the ſame, a numerical Unity. If by the Light he means *a thin Collection of minute Particles*, as he, *pag.* 58. defines it, then he ſuppoſes the Splendor to be a ſecond Sun, *emitting a ſmall ſort of active, ſubtile and piercing Particles:* but if by Light and Splendor he means thoſe Idea's thoſe Particles cauſe in us, he cannot diſtinguiſh between Splendour and the Light of the Splendor, becauſe Splendour is but a greater degree of Light cauſed by thoſe minute Particles in a greater Quantity, or more directly ſtriking our Eyes; ſo that his *Simily* is every way faulty.

But becauſe in his often repeated Similies about the Sun, its Light and Heat,

Heat, he ſuppoſes ſomewhat in the Sun, or which does exiſt by emaning from it, analogous to our Idea's of Light and Heat; I told him, *Sect.* 69. That though there is in the Sun a Power to produce in us Heat and Light, as well as Pain and Pleaſure, yet there are no ſuch Senſations or Qualities in the Sun, which though (*pag.* 57.) he argues againſt, yet he ſays the very ſame thing; but leſt his Reader ſhould perceive it, he calls the Effects (which when one pretends to talk Philoſophically, is very improper) by the Names of the Cauſes, and will not ſay that Heat is cauſed by, but that Heat is a cloſe Collection of minute, ſubtile, active, piercing Particles, and Light a thinner Collection of them. But do Clothes and Exerciſe by cauſing Heat, produce a Collection of ſuch Particles? Why do they not ſometimes produce Light, which is but a leſs cloſe Collection? But in arguing thus, he grants all I would have, *viz.* That there are no ſuch Qualities in the Sun, or emaning from it: but the Sun being a Body in perpetual Agitation, there are minute Particles flowing from it, which by their Figure, Texture and Motion, alter the Figure, Texture and Motion of ſome of the ſmalleſt parts of our Hands and Eyes, and thereby produce in us Light and Heat, which are as much meer perceptions as Pain and Pleaſure. And I ſay again, there has not been any Book writ theſe late Years on this Subject, but what proves there's nothing in Matter, beſides Bulk, external Figure, and internal Configuration of its minute Parts, which by their Motion produce in us Heat, Light, Colour, Sound, Taſte, *&c.* But enough of this.

Our Author ſays in his firſt Defence, *pag.* 20. *That outwardly and in reference to the Creation, they* [the three Divine Natures] *are perfectly one and the ſame God, as concurring in all the ſame external Actions, though in relation to one another there is a real diſtinction between them.* But if there is no diſtinction between them in reſpect of the Creatures to whom they are one and the ſame God; why do the Trinitarians worſhip them as numerically different Gods? for if they adored them as the ſame God, it would be as impoſſible to worſhip the one and not the other, as to worſhip and not to worſhip the ſame God. But can there be a real and not a real diſtinction between them? The reaſon he gives why the three Divine Natures are but one God, is as ſurprizing as the thing it ſelf; it is becauſe they *concur* in all the ſame external Actions: But if each is God, does it not ſuppoſe three concurring Gods? Can one and the ſame God be ſaid to concur with himſelf? Is it not directly againſt the Honour of the Father, who is God in the higheſt Senſe, to ſuppoſe him but a concurring God? It is in a manner ungodding him, ſince we cannot ſay then that we owe more than the third part of our Being, Preſervation and Happineſs to him. For to attribute them wholly to him, would be robbing the other two who equally concur with him, of what is their due:

due: and no Action can be wholly attributed to one, which jointly belongs to Three. But if it be injurious to each Divine Nature to aſcribe to it but a Third of thoſe Benefits we receive; it muſt be injurious to ſay they concur'd in conferring them. But if he ſays each wholly does all external Actions, then he contradicts himſelf in ſuppoſing each concurs; for he that wholly does an Action, can never be ſaid to concur in doing it. And if the Father be the Original of Mankind, there cannot be a ſecond and third Original, except Men can have as many Origins. A ſecond Original is as great nonſenſe as a Second Firſt, and a firſt Original is no more Senſe than a Firſt Firſt: But I refer the Defender to my Letter, from *Sect.* 77, to 83. where I have handled this Point more fully. By this time I believe it is evident to an impartial Reader, that nothing our Author has affirmed of the Son and Holy Spirit does abate of their being Gods in the higheſt Senſe, or make them one and the ſame God with the Father; and conſequently there cannot be a more open and groſſer Polytheiſm than his Hypotheſis of three eternal and neceſſary Divine Natures. But,

The Defender is not content with aſſerting three ſuch Natures, (which one would think ſufficiently abſurd) but he alſo runs into a Number of Inconſiſtences concerning the Manner of the Exiſtence of two of theſe Natures in making them ſuch, and yet not ſelf-exiſtent, or from none; but that they had their eternal Beings from another. Now as it is evident that whatſoever is ſelf-exiſtent is eternal, becauſe there is no Author or Cauſe of its being; ſo it is as evident, that whatſoever is not ſelf-exiſtent, but has receiv'd its Being from another, or has been cauſed to be, cannot be from Eternity; becauſe to receive a Being, or to be cauſed to be, ſuppoſeth the Non-being to precede Being. They muſt once not be, otherwiſe they were not capable of being cauſed to be; and conſequently they could not always have been in being or from Eternity. What can be a more manifeſt Contradiction, than that that which had ever been, ſhould once be cauſed to be? or that that which had been from all Eternity, ſhould from not-being be produced, cauſed or emaned into Being? Or muſt not that which is emaned into being, ſometime or other begin to be? Or can that which has a Beginning be from Eternity, which neceſſarily ſuppoſeth no Beginning? For we have no *Idea* of any thing being from Eternity, but that it had no Origin. But our Author, *pag.* 46. ſays, That *the Son and Spirit had an Origin.* And *Prop.* 6. *The Father is the Original of all other Beings, in which the Son and Holy Spirit are comprehended.* So that we muſt (if we can) believe that two neceſſary Natures had an eternal Origin or Beginning; and that they have been cauſed to be, tho they have always been. It's as great a Contradiction to ſay, that that which has had an Origin has been from Eternity, as that that which will have an End ſhall laſt.

laſt to Eternity: And if what has had an Origin, can be from Eternity, Creation, which is but giving an Origin to things, may be from Eternity. And why might not God cauſe a thing to be voluntarily as well as neceſſarily from Eternity, ſince in both Caſes Being is equally beſtow'd? And every Being that is not without a Cauſe, (as God the Father alone is) muſt have a Beginning; for there is no Medium between having Being from none, and from ſome one: and what has Being from ſome one, muſt once be without Being, and ſo have a Beginning. And if God be Eternal becauſe he is Self-exiſtent, by parity of Reaſon, what is not Self-exiſtent cannot be from Eternity: *Eadem eſt ratio contrariorum*, is as undoubted a Maxim as any whatever; ſo that nothing can be more evident than that, To have an Origin or Cauſe, or not to be ſelf-exiſtent, and to be from Eternity, are inconſiſtent. And if they are inconſiſtent in themſelves, whatever Terms you expreſs them in, they will be ſtill inconſiſtent. Whence it ſavours (to ſay no worſe) of great prejudice, and fondneſs of an Hypotheſis, that when a thing is a Contradiction in ſome Terms, to ſeek out others to hide the Contradiction.

But our Author is ſo unhappy in his Attempt, that the very Terms he makes uſe of, (viz. *To have Exiſtence from God by way of neceſſary emanation*) contain in themſelves a direct Contradiction: for whatſoever ſubſtantial Being or Nature emaneth from another, muſt before its Emanation exiſt ſome way or other in the Nature it emaneth from, otherwiſe it is impoſſible to emane from it, but it muſt emane from nothing, which is the very ſame as Creation: For every Nature muſt either emane from nothing, or from the Nature in which it preexiſted. But to ſuppoſe a Nature to exiſt by emaning, is to ſuppoſe it did not exiſt before its Emanation, and conſequently could not emane from another Nature, but from nothing: Except it firſt emaned from the Nature and afterward exiſted; which puts me in mind of a certain Poet, who introduces *Adam* in great haſte going to be created. So that if the Son and H. Spirit did not exiſt before their Emanation, it is impoſſible they ſhould emane from God, otherwiſe than that God by the voluntary exerciſe of his Divine Power emaned them from nothing; and conſequently they could not emane or *iſſue forth* (as he *Prop.* 15. terms it) from the Divine Nature. But if the Son and Holy Spirit did exiſt before they emaned, they did not exiſt by Emanation, but were ſelf-exiſtent as the Nature of the Father. Upon my aſſerting of which, *Sect.* 58. he anſwers *pag.* 47. *But I ſay with as great aſſurance, that whatſoever Subſtance emanes from another, muſt owe its exiſtence to that other; and the contrary is a manifeſt Contradiction*, but to whom I know not except to himſelf. But I muſt beg leave to diſſent and tell him, that all Subſtances whatſoever owe their exiſtence to God, and not to the Subſtance they emane from; and that all Generation,

neration, Emanation, or Proceſſion in created Beings, is only the different Forms and Figures which the various Coalitions of Matter, according to the Laws of Motion, do produce: and conſequently whatever Subſtance emanes from another, however it may be modified by it, does not owe its Exiſtence to it, but is as old as the Creation it ſelf. And by Parity of Reaſon, whatſoever emanes from a ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance, does not owe its Exiſtence to the Subſtance it emanes from, but is as ſelf-exiſtent as that Subſtance. Though to exiſt by emaning except from nothing, be, as hath been ſhown, nothing leſs than a Contradiction; yet our Author tells us, *pag.* 18. *it is a very preſumptuous Conceit*, and in the ſecond Defence, *pag.* 25. *an intolerable Preſumption not to conclude it poſſible.* Though he further ſays, *we have a clearer Idea of it than voluntary Creation*; yet all the Idea he gives us of it is, That it's a more excellent way of exiſting than that of Creation.

But before I proceed in the Examination of his Hypotheſis, it will be neceſſary to obviate an exception he takes at my uſing words taken from material Subſtances, in diſcourſing of Spiritual ones; which is a moſt frivolous exception, becauſe it is impoſſible to be avoided, ſince we have no Ideas, and conſequently no words to expreſs them in, but what we have from ſenſible or material Objects, and the operations of our Minds about them; as is fully demonſtrated in Mr. *Lock*'s *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding:* And it is ſufficiently evident from Holy Scripture it ſelf, which that we may underſtand it, repreſents God with Face, Eyes, Hands, Bowels, back parts, Motion from Place to Place, *&c.* and ſo Spirits are deſcrib'd as Standing, Falling down, *&c.* and in a Word, ſo are all other things relating to ſpiritual Beings. But this exception is very ſtrange from one whoſe Hypotheſis is built chiefly upon *Emanations*, which is a Word borrow'd from Matter, and ſignifies thoſe minute Parts or Effluvia's of Matter which flow from Bodies: and his Hypotheſis makes the whole, or the one Divine Eſſence, either to emane from it ſelf, or to be diviſible, and have parts emane from it; or elſe what he ſays is wholly unintelligible.

The firſt Argument I made uſe of, *Sect.* 57. to ſhew it impoſſible the Son and Spirit could emane from the Father, was, That they being both infinite Subſtances, and as ſuch being equal; to ſuppoſe two Infinites to emane from one, is to ſuppoſe twice as much to emane from a Being or Subſtance, as the Being is. To which he anſwers, *I change his Phraſe, Beings whoſe Perfections are unlimited, and who have all they can have without a manifeſt Contradiction*; which Phraſe by the way, is not to be found in his Propoſitions. But why might not I call them *infinite Subſtances*, ſince twice in his Propoſitions by way of Explication, he calls them Subſtances, and every where talks of the Union of their Subſtances: and *pag.* 56. of his *third Defence*, de-

fines *Perſon* by *Subſtance?* And it is evident, that if the Subſtances do not emane, the Perfections that ſubſiſt in them cannot emane; and if the Perfections are infinite or unlimited, the Subſtances cannot be *finite* or *limited:* and *pag.* 8. he expreſly ſays, *The Son and Holy Ghoſt are all boundleſs and infinite.* But where is the Difference between *Infinite* and his own term *unlimited?* Does not the one ſignify without Bounds, as the other without End? and the Argument will equally hold with the one Term or the other. Therefore I have no Reaſon to change thoſe Terms, nor did I injure him in uſing them. But that all Infinites are equal, is as evident as that there is an inequality between Finite and Infinite: for if one Infinite were leſs than another, there muſt be ſome bound or end of that Infinite, which would be to make it Finite; wherefore for two Infinites to emane from one, is to ſay, twice as much emanes from a Being as the Being is. Nay, if the Son and Holy Spirit were both but one Infinite, to ſuppoſe them to emane from but one other Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the whole Infinite to emane from it ſelf; but if their Nature each of them is as truly Divine and Infinite as that of the Father, they muſt each of them be equal to him, and conſequently cannot emane from him. Can two Suns (which is a more proper Simily for equal Natures, than the Sun and the Rays) emane from one Sun? Would it not be to ſuppoſe twice as much to emane from the Sun as was in it?

The Defender upon better thoughts, though I did not make uſe of his Phraſes, thus replies, *Be he pleaſed to take notice, that there is nothing in this acute arguing, except he means by infinite Subſtances, Subſtances of an infinite bigneſs.* He might as well have ſaid, *To be and not to be* was a Contradiction only in Subſtances of infinite bigneſs; for the Reaſon is the ſame, of what Nature or ſort ſoever the Subſtances be, provided they were capable of emaning: Becauſe the Argument does not depend upon a Being having Bigneſs or Quantity, but upon the equality of Beings that emane from one another: For let an equal number which has neither Matter nor Bulk emane from an equal; does not the whole Number emane from it ſelf? So ſubſtract an Hour from an Hour, and ſee what becomes of the firſt Hour. So that if the Nature of the Father emanes from it ſelf an infinite and boundleſs Nature, it muſt wholly exhauſt the Nature of the Father, which is but Boundleſs and Infinite. But to ſuppoſe two ſuch Natures to emane from him, is to ſuppoſe twice as much to emane as the Father's Nature is. It is (as I obſerved *Sect.* 59.) dividing one infinite Subſtance into three infinite Parts. To which he replies, *How does our Author already run Taplaſh? But I will not therefore forbear replying, and I anſwer, No doubt it is a horrid Contradiction ſo to affirm: but how rank doth this ſmell of the groſs thing called Body? his Mind runs altogether upon material Subſtances, which alone,*

alone, I ſay, have Parts to be divided into. Then he goes on to demonſtrate, that an infinite Spiritual Subſtance cannot be divided into infinite Spiritual Parts; which is the abſurdity, or if he pleaſes, the *Taplaſh* I am condemning as the immediate conſequence of his Hypotheſis. For what difference can we perceive between one infinite Nature emaning out of it ſelf two infinite Natures, by which it ſo far parts with them, as they become two diſtinct and diverſe Natures from it, as diſtinct and different as ſo many Men or Angels, and one infinite Nature divided into three infinite Parts? And by our Author's leave we not only attribute Parts to Matter, but we are forc'd to do ſo to every thing (whether Finite or Infinite) we can in our Minds add to and abſtract from, which we cannot but conceive as Parts. So we ſay that Numbers and Duration, and Space though Infinite, have Parts. And the ſober Enquirer, in his *View of the Conſiderations*, pag. 92. owns that *conceptible parts in the Deity no Man can avoid:* And if neither the whole Divine Nature nor a part of it emaned from it ſelf, it is a Contradiction to our Idea's, that any thing ſhould emane from it: What is a Contradiction in thoſe Terms, will be ſo in any other.

But to gratify our Author as much as poſſible, we will expreſs his Doctrine in the ſofteſt Terms we can, *viz.* one ſelf-exiſtent, eternal and neceſſary Nature, which alone is firſt in Nature, not in Time, whilſt it remains ſuch, being not ſubject to any alteration whatever, becomes neceſſarily and eternally, three eternal and neceſſary Natures, two of which are not ſelf-exiſtent. Or in other words, one immutable God neceſſarily and eternally becomes three Gods of the ſame Nature, but not three ſelf-exiſtent Gods: which though they are monſtrous Contradictions in themſelves, and to our conception of but one God; yet our Author is ſo happy as to be able to tell us how this is done, namely, by Emanation, whereby two of theſe Natures *iſſued forth* (as he terms it) from the ſelf-exiſtent Nature. And though each of theſe Natures is equal to the Nature from whence they emaned; yet the emaning Nature is not capable of the leaſt Diminution: Though one would think to have two Natures to emane from one ſingle Nature, ſo as to be diſtinct and different in Number from it, muſt be a diminution to that Nature, ſince it has two Natures by emaning them from it ſelf leſs than it had. But if the Nature of God is indiviſible, and conſequently no part nor any thing of it can emane; nothing can be more evident but that all other Natures, becauſe not ſelf-exiſtent, muſt be produc'd from nothing. But he ſays, *pag.* 13. *There is not a Creature that generates another of the ſame kind, but may be properly ſaid to communicate its own Nature, and yet notwithſtanding forgoes not its own individual Nature, nor any part of it.* But by his leave every generating Creature does part with ſome of its Subſtance, (which he may call Nature)

whereof the *Fœtus* is form'd, and which by Acceſſion of Nouriſhment grows at length to be a Nature or Subſtance equal to its Parent. But in the divine Generation the Son and Spirit have their whole Beings and Natures from the Father's Nature, and not by acceſſion from without, but all at once, and from all Eternity. So that for the Father to communicate his Nature to each of them, whoſe Natures are equal to his, would be doubly to annihilate himſelf.

For a Nature to multiply its kind, is a ſign of Defect and Weakneſs in that kind of Nature: for the ſame Reaſon that makes it capable of Propagating, makes it ſubject to Corruption and Diſſolution, becauſe it ſuppoſes it diviſible and ſubject to augmentation and diminution, which Beings in their Nature immortal are not; and therefore what can be more abſurd than to argue from Beings that are diviſible, and for that reaſon alone capable of Generation or Emanation, to Beings that are indiviſible, and conſequently not capable of having Emanations flow from their Subſtances? I know none in his Senſes ever ſuppoſed ſo groſs a thing of finite Spirits as propagating their kind: however ſome Men take the Liberty not only to ſuppoſe it of God himſelf, but that he acts therein neceſſarily as inanimate Beings do; nay, they ſuppoſe it to be one of the higheſt and moſt eſſential Perfections of his Nature, which I conceive to be moſt abſurd, as well as a moſt high Affront to the ſole infinite Majeſty of God; and it carries this in it, that it neceſſarily inferreth not only a Plurality, but an Infinity of Gods: For if God does not conſtantly and neceſſarily multiply Divine Natures, he has loſt a Perfection which they ſay is eſſential and neceſſary to his Nature; which change cannot happen in the Nature of God, but if (as the Sun ſucceſſively emits an innumerable company of new Rays) he does from Eternity to Eternity produce new Natures, they muſt needs be infinite in Number. But if he ſays God is eternally emaning into Exiſtence the Son and Holy Spirit, it is ſo far from being true, that they were eternally begotten or emaned into actual Being, that they never will be ſo, though the Father is in doing it from Eternity to Eternity, by a continued ſucceſſive Generating. But how can they that were, as he ſays, boundleſs and infinite from Eternity, be capable of any farther Production? And every new or farther Production muſt be as infinite and boundleſs as each of them.

Having thus fully (as I ſuppoſe) ſhown the impoſſibility of the Father's iſſuing forth Emanations from his own Nature, I ſhall be the ſhorter in my Remarks upon his Anſwers.

I ſaid, *Sect.* 59. upon Suppoſition that the Son and Spirit are neceſſary Emanations, I cannot ſee how they owe their Origin more to the Father, than the Father to them, ſince they are all three of a Subſtance, which is ſelf-exiſtent; *Which is* (he ſays) *very ſurprizing*, and *as much as to ſay, that the Root no leſs owes its Origin*

to

to the Tree, or the Rays to the Sun, than vice versâ. As to his Simily from the Sun, I have ſufficiently ſpoken to it already. As to that about the Root and the Tree, it is evident (not to mention that the Tree cannot owe its Origin to the Root, becauſe it is part of the Tree) that the Trunk and Branches do not owe their Origin to the Root, but are all viſibly in the Seed, which by Nouriſhment received from without, do equally increaſe to their deſigned Bulk. But to make it any ways parallel, Suppoſe a ſelf-exiſtent Root to emane neceſſarily from it ſelf (without any new Matter added to it) two Trunks, each of which is as big as the emaning Root; would not the Subſtances of all three be ſelf-exiſtent, ſince they are all three of the ſelf-ſame ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance; and conſequently one can no more owe its Origin to another, than the ſelf-ſame Subſtance can owe its Origin to it ſelf?

In the ſame Section I ſaid, Whatſoever [Subſtance] proceeds from another, muſt firſt be in it, except it can be in it and proceed from it at the ſame time. Upon which he asks, *Whether the Rays are not as old as the Sun? or whether all Thoughts muſt be younger than Minds, becauſe they have their Original from them?* As to the firſt, I grant the Rays are as old as the Sun, and the reaſon is, becauſe they have the ſame Origin as the Sun; yet they cannot be in the Sun, and emane from it at the ſame time. As to the ſecond, Whether Thoughts are younger than Minds, it is not to the purpoſe, becauſe we are diſcourſing of Subſtances, and of ſubſtantial Emanations; which if he ſuppoſes Thoughts to be, how many Subſtances would be created and annihilated in a Minute? But however, to anſwer his Queſtion, All Thoughts muſt be younger than Minds, becauſe Thoughts are Operations of the Mind, in conceiving and comparing *Idea's* together, conſequently Minds muſt be before Thoughts. But though all Thoughts muſt be younger than Minds, becauſe they owe their Origin to the Mind, as being meer Operations of the Mind; yet the Powers or Abilities that are eſſential to the Mind, muſt be as old as the Mind, becauſe they do not owe their Origin to the Mind. Here he blames me for calling Emanation a *Separation*, and ſays, That *Diſtinction, Separation and Difference, are ſeveral things.* I ſuppoſe moſt of the Trinitarians think Diſtinction and Difference to be ſo, becauſe their Books are full of Diſtinctions without Difference. He further ſays, That *tho the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father, yet they are ſtill in him, and ever have been in him.* But to emane from, to iſſue forth and proceed from, and yet ſtill to be in, are Contradictions in our Conceptions. And our Author, *Pag.* 45. makes *emaning from, and kindling*, the ſame. But what is kindling, but ſeparating the Parts of any thing one from another, by a violent rapid Motion? And what is the Emanation of the Rays, which he ſo much inſiſts on, but their ſeparation

from

from the Body of the Sun?

In the next, *Sect.* 60. he wholly miſtakes the Argument, and then wanders to God's Decrees; which is nothing to the Purpoſe, in a Diſcourſe of ſubſtantial Emanations.

Upon my ſaying, *Sect.* 63. What greater Abſurdity can there be, than that Beings which have infinite Perfections, ſhould want *ſome?* Beſides a long Harangue about Infinite, he anſwers, *It is no monſtrous Buſineſs to imagine, that a Being which has not every Perfection, may have thoſe it is poſſeſt of, in the higheſt degree.* To which I reply, that it is monſtrous that a Divine Nature which he owns contains all Perfections, ſhould want ſome Perfections, and thoſe the chiefeſt: Or that Natures, that are, as he ſays, *boundleſs and infinite*, ſhould not have infinite Perfections; which is to make them (to uſe his Word) *unlimited* in Eſſence, but limited in the Perfections of Eſſence, as wanting the greateſt; the want of which *abates*, (as he ſays, *pag.* 7.) and conſequently bounds their boundleſs Perfections. Nor can they have in the higheſt Degree thoſe Perfections they are poſſeſt of, as unlimited Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs: For if the Father be the only Wiſe, the only Good, and greater than the Son and Spirit, they have not thoſe Perfections in the higheſt Degree, nor are they (as I have already proved) unlimited. God cannot communicate any of his Attributes, without communicating all; becauſe he cannot communicate any, without communicating his Divine Eſſence, in which (as all Properties do in a Subſtance) they inſeparably exiſt. And if God communicate his Eſſence, he muſt communicate with it his Self-exiſtence and Independency, which are alſo inſeparable from his Eſſence.

I muſt now beg leave to tranſcribe my *Sect.* 68. that the Reader may the better ſee whether it contains ſo GROSS A CONCEIT, and ſuch BEASTLY STUPIDITY, as our Author, *pag.* 55. charges it with.—— "If they, the three ſuppoſed infinite "Subſtances, are more than one, they "cannot be Infinite, becauſe being "Subſtances of the ſame Sort, they "muſt be bounded and limited one "by another. If the Subſtance of "the Father be every where, How "can the Subſtance of the Son be "every where too, *at the ſame time, "and after the ſame manner?* For "if Beings can be in the ſame Place "at the ſame time, in the ſame man-"ner as they muſt be if they are of "the ſame ſort, it is impoſſible to "diſtinguiſh them; becauſe we have "no other mark of diſtinction be-"tween Beings, but that they can-"not be in the ſame Place, at the "ſame time, in the ſame manner.

I hope our Author will grant that two Numbers will determine one the other, becauſe if they did not, they would be one and the ſame: and conſequently whatever things we predicate two or more of, they muſt bound one another, otherwiſe they could not be two: what makes them two, muſt neceſſarily limit them; ſo that two

Infinites

Infinites are a plain Contradiction, because nothing can be Infinite which is determined: but if they are two, they muſt be determined, otherwiſe they would not be two but one and the ſame. One Infinite cannot contain or comprehend another Infinite; if it did, it would be the ſame and not another; therefore that other muſt determine it: What is not all of the ſame kind, and ſo is ſingular, muſt have bounds or limits, otherwiſe it would be all; and this is ſo very plain, that ſhould a Man in any other Caſe affirm more than one Infinite of the ſame kind, he would ſcarce be thought to be in his Senſes. Who was ever ſo ridiculous as to aſſert more than one Infinite Space, more than one infinite Duration? yet neither Space nor Duration are corporeal Subſtances. To ſuppoſe two infinite Spaces or Durations, muſt we not neceſſarily ſuppoſe an end or limit to one, before the other can commence? To ſuppoſe two Infinites of the ſame ſort, is to ſuppoſe an infinite addition to that which is already Infinite; therefore it's very evident that whatever Nature or ſort a Being is of, if we conceive more than one, we cannot conceive any of them as Infinite; nor can we believe that the three Perſons are (as he ſuppoſes) as different as ſo many Men or Angels, and yet believe that each of them can be after the ſame manner every where, becauſe holding both, is to believe them diſtinct and not diſtinct, different yet the ſame. And this muſt neceſſarily be, as long as we have no other marks of Identity and Diverſity, but that Beings cannot be after the ſame manner, in the ſame Place, at the ſame time: If our Author had any other marks of Identity and Diverſity, he ought to have diſcovered them before he was ſo free of his obliging Expreſſions. If there can be more than one Infinite of a ſort, there can no reaſon be aſſign'd why there may not be an infinite Number as well as two or three; ſo that it would not be abſurd to ſuppoſe an infinite number of Spaces, Durations, *&c.* And if more than one infinite Being can be every where, an infinite Number may as well be every where; and by parity of Reaſon a vaſt Number of finite Spirits may be in the very ſame Space as contains one, which our Author very roundly ſuppoſes, and ſays, *They that do not ſuppoſe it have no manner of Notion of what they believe.* But Mr. *Lock* (whom I never heard charg'd with *beaſtly ſtupidity*, or of having no Notion of what he ſays) in his Eſſay of Human Underſtanding, Ch. *Identity*, ſpeaks thus: "We have "Idea's but of three ſorts of Sub- "ſtances; firſt God, ſecond finite In- "telligences, third Bodies. Though "theſe three ſorts of Subſtances do "not exclude one another out of the "ſame Place, yet we cannot conceive "but that they muſt neceſſarily each "of them, exclude any of the ſame "*kind* out of the ſame Place, or elſe "the Notions of Identity and Di- "verſity would be in vain. There "could be no ſuch diſtinction of Sub- "ſtances or any thing elſe from one "another. And

And if other Authorities after this great Man were not needleſs, I might add the Learned *Cuſanus*, who *Lib. 3. de mente*, ſays, *Impoſſibile eſt plura eſſe Infinita, quoniam alterum eſſet in altero finitum.* There cannot be more than one Infinite, becauſe the one would make the other Finite. And another Learned Author ſays, *Quicquid actu eſt infinitum, ei nequit dari menſura. Deus eſt actu infinitus, nequit ergo ei dari menſura qua menſuretur. At ſi plures eſſent Dei, unus eſſet menſura aliorum, & ſic nullus eorum eſſet infinitus. There can be no meaſure of that which is actually infinite: God is actually infinite, therefore there can be no meaſure of him. But if there were more Gods than one, none of them would be Infinite, becauſe they would be a Meaſure one to another.* Therefore his three Divine Natures being (as he ſuppoſes) every way united to one another, cannot but be a Meaſure to one another. And the greater part even of the Trinitarians the Modaliſts, look upon our Author's Doctrine of three infinite Natures, as a notorious Contradiction.

But the Defender to prove his aſſertion asks, *How can God be in thoſe Spaces fill'd with Body? or how can Body and Soul be in the ſame Space?* Which Queſtions I thought I had prevented, by adding — *Beings of the ſame ſort after the ſame manner:* but that he ſays, *can be only for a Blind.* To which I ſhall no otherwiſe reply, than by putting him in mind of the Proverb, *There are none ſo blind as thoſe that will not ſee.* However by the by, it's a pretty way of anſwering Arguments, to tell his Reader, That that wherein the Strength of his Argument lies, *can be only for a Blind*, pag. 55. But this Argument holds not only in Subſtances of all ſorts, but in *Modes* and *Properties*; as for inſtance, more than one with infinite Power is a Contradiction; becauſe infinite Power neceſſarily ſuppoſes Supream Power, which becauſe all delegated Power is contain'd in it, comprehends *all Power.* And ſince our Author, *pag. 61.* has *a diſtinct Notion of a Being abſolutely Perfect, and Beings of unlimited Perfections*; I deſire to know what Idea's he has of three having each of them ſupream or unlimited Power over the Univerſe? Is it not firſt aſſerting that one has it, then denying it by ſaying another has it? The Chriſtians of the firſt Ages thought it an unanſwerable Argument againſt the Heathens, that there could not be more than one God, becauſe there could not be (ſupream Power being indiviſible) more than one that could enjoy it. How eaſily could the Heathens have retorted this Argument upon the Chriſtians, had they held with our Author more Natures than one, each with ſupream or unlimited Power: So that if the Father has all or ſupream Power, it's evident the Power of the Son can be no other than a delegated ſubordinate Power, and conſequently not unlimited and infinite; and the Reaſon will equally hold for all other Divine Perfections: So that by what has been

ſaid

ſaid it appears, that to ſuppoſe more than one Divine Nature, is to make God a Finite and limited Nature with Finite and limited Perfections, which is in a manner as diſhonourable to God, as to deny he has any Being at all.

But our Author is not content with what he ſays here, but *pag.* 58. after a long Dialogue of his own framing, (where he makes *a Man of my Head-piece* (as he phraſes it) *not heſitate at replying* that Space is a real nothing, and a great many ſilly things beſides) he charges me with *prodigious, monſtrous Preſumption, in drawing moſt confident concluſions from Premiſes that are unſpeakably above the reach of human Underſtanding*—and *with Folly and Madneſs in the Liberty I take with the moſt profoundly adorable Deity* (he ſhould have ſaid *Deities.*) In anſwer to which, and all his harangue concerning *Mystery*, and the difficulties *pag.* 46) about *Eternity, &c.* which a Polytheiſt might as well make uſe of for a Million of Gods, or a Papiſt for Tranſubſtantiation, or any other Contradiction though never ſo palpable; I ſhall only ask our Author, Are Infinity and Eternity mere empty Sounds without Idea's annext to them? If they are, why does he uſe ſuch words? If they are not, is it not poſſible to join other Idea's to them, which are manifeſtly inconſiſtent with them? which if he has done, then all his Common-place-Harangue will not make them conſiſtent. To what end is ſuch an Harangue? except he will ſay, there's no knowing a Contradiction from a Difficulty. Or muſt a Man be oblig'd to ſolve all the difficulties in Nature and Metaphyſicks, before he can have a Right to tell him, that he is chargeable with as groſs Contradictions, as *to be*, and *not to be*. For though our Idea's of Infinity and Eternity are not compleat and adequate, (as perhaps our Idea's of few other things are) yet as far as they reach, they are as diſtinct and clear as any other; otherwiſe we could not demonſtrate that there is an infinite eternal Being, of which we have as great a certainty as of any Mathematical Demonſtration. Our Idea of Infinity conſiſts in a ſuppoſed endleſs Progreſſion of the Mind, which is ſtill adding on to thoſe large ſteps it firſt takes: Whatever beſides the Inexhauſtibility of the Subject, puts a ſtop to the Mind's adding on, is directly contrary to our Idea of Infinity. As for inſtance, ſuppoſe you join a beginning to infinite Duration, you thereby neceſſarily put a ſtop to the Mind's adding: and therefore our Author's aſſertion of an eternal Beginning or Origin, is as plain a Contradiction as To be, and Not to be eternal. So in adding one Infinite to another, you put a ſtop to the progreſſion of the Mind concerning the firſt Infinite; becauſe inſtead of adding on, the Mind has actually paſt over one Infinite, and is viewing another. To add two Infinites together, is (as Mr. *Lock* ſays, Ch. *Infinity*, §. 20.) *too groſs an abſurdity to be confuted.* What is it then to ſuppoſe three Infinites, and thoſe two every

way closely united to one another? In this case, which way soever the Mind turns it self, its Idea of Infinity is destroy'd; their Continuity or Union every way terminating one another.

So that at last all the monstrous prodigious Presumption I am guilty of, is, in owning the weakness of my Understanding, the shortness of my Idea's, and consequently the narrowness of my Belief, in not giving assent to what appears to be a Contradiction to the Unity and Infinity of the Divine Nature.

I hope by this time the Reader is satisfied, that the 68*th Section* in my Letter, did not deserve those hard words the Defender was pleas'd to bestow upon it. Had I asserted (as he does, *pag.* 52.) the *Infinity of Quantity*, I had deserv'd some such Compliments. But I must excuse him since I find what he there says is too true, that he *understands nothing of Infinite*, and that *it is an amusing confounding word for his Brains*; which, all Unitarians must think, is some excuse for his asserting the Son and Holy Spirit to be *all Boundless and Infinite*, as *pag.* 8.

I said, *Sect.* 70. As there can be no Inequality, such as he supposes between infinite Beings; so we cannot pay a lower degree of Honour to the Son and Spirit than to the Father, without supposing an infinite distance between them. For as long as we pray to each as having necessarily inherent in himself infinite Power, Wisdom, *&c.* our Devotion terminates in each, we give each the same Divine Honour. To which he says, *p.* 58. "This is a very false Charge, for "we heartily acknowledg that all the "Honour we pay to the Son and H. "Spirit, ought to be ultimately ter-"minated in the Father; and I am sure "he cannot think otherwise of those "he calls the real Trinitarians, because "their Hypothesis necessarily obliges "them so to believe, whatever the "Hypothesis of the others does. But "the Holy Scripture is so express "upon this Point, that I should think "no Christian should find it hard to "believe it, no, tho there were no o-"ther Text but this for it, *viz.*—*That "at the Name of Jesus every Knee "should bow*——*to the glory of "God the Father*, Phil. 2. 9, 10, 11.

We will now first see when it can be said, that the Honour we give a Person is not for his own, but for the sake of another on whom it ultimately terminates; and then examine whether it be such an Honour which the Trinitarians give to the Son and Holy Spirit. 1 2

The Honour we give a Person, does not ultimately terminate on him when it is not for any inherent Quality in himself, but for the sake of some Power, Trust or Office that is receiv'd from another, and which he holds during the Will of that other. Thus we pay Honour to a Vice-roy, a Judg, a Magistrate, because they are the Image, or some way represent that Person who endued them with Power. Whatever Honour or Deference we pay such Persons, it still terminates in the Supreme; it is for his Sake and to his Honour: 1

Honour: And the Reaſon is, becauſe ſuch Perſons, how much ſoever they may be advanced above their fellow-Subjects; yet in reſpect of the Perſon that advanced them, they have no Power at all, but are meer Miniſters and Servants. So our Lord Chriſt, tho he is highly advanced as a Reward of his perfect Obedience above all his fellow-Creatures; yet in reſpect of God he is a meer Miniſter and Servant, wholly impotent, can (as he ſaith) do nothing of himſelf: and the Reaſon why the Honour given him in Scripture is not for his own ſake, but for the Glory of God the Father, is, becauſe it is a delegated Honour, God has *made* him a *Prince and Saviour*, giving him all Power after his Reſurrection: or becauſe (as this Text ſays) *God has highly exalted him, and given him a Name above every Name.* And there is no inſtance in Scripture where any Honour, Glory, Power and Dignity is aſcribed to Chriſt, either by himſelf or any Man or Angel, but is expreſly given to him either as a Man, or as the free gift of God to a Man. And it's more than probable, that this is ſo done, leſt it ſhould adminiſter occaſion to People to terminate their Worſhip on him, as a Divine Nature, with all Perfections neceſſarily and eternally inhering in him. It would be abſurd, if he had ſuch a Nature, not to worſhip him for himſelf ultimately; except an eternal and neceſſary Divine Nature is not to be worſhip'd for its own ſake, which would be to ſay, that the Father is not to be worſhip'd ultimately for the ſake of his Divine Nature. The Honour that does not terminate on the Perſon, is never given to the Creator but to the Creature: and of this Nature is that Honour or Worſhip we give to thoſe Gods or ſupreme Powers which are the Deputies or Repreſentatives of the moſt high God: which Worſhip does not ultimately terminate on them, becauſe what they have they have from God, and hold it only during his Pleaſure: What then can be a ſtronger Argument that the Son is not God than this, that the Honour we are oblig'd to pay him, does not ultimately terminate in him but in another? If any thing were ſtrange from our Author, this would be, that he that is God is not to be worſhip'd for his own ſake, or that a ſupream Being muſt not have ſupream Honour.

But let us now ſee what ſort of Worſhip it is which the Trinitarians pay to the Son. They, of whatſoever Denomination, are ſo far from honouring the Son for the ſake, and to the Glory of God the Father, that in their publick Prayers and Liturgies, they give him equal Honour with God the Father; and both Papiſt and Proteſtant Trinitarians in their damning Creed make them equal, and declare that *none is before nor after another, none greater or leſs than another, the Glory equal, the Majeſty coeternal.* Which equality is as much to the Glory of God the Father, as it would be to the Glory of a King to have his Subjects ſet up two others with equal Power and Majeſty. Therefore I

wonder with what assurance our Author can deny, that the Trinitarians have 3 Objects of supream Worship: and he himself in this Treatise is for giving Divine Worship to the Son and Holy Spirit; and Divine Worship can be no other than Supream, and consequently must terminate in the Person to whom it is given. Nay, he cannot terminate his Worship more in one than in another, since all three are (as he says) one and the same God with respect to the Creatures.

All that our Author can say is, that it is to the Honour of God the Father, because they depend on him; but the more dependent he supposes them, the more absurd it is to pay the same Honour to a dependent, as he does to the independent Being. But their dependence, since he makes them necessary Beings, is Independence: And because our Author is much taken with Similies, I shall oblige him with one that is more parallel than that of the Sun and Rays. Suppose (for there has been such a thing in Nature) one Man born with, and growing out of the side of another, who was a distinct Man, though necessarily united to him, which was manifest by their discoursing one with another. Now in this instance, we have one intelligent Substance emaning from another; yet this did not make him owe his Being or continuance in Being to the other, since they had the same cause of Being and continuance in Being, on which cause both were equally dependent, and not one upon the other: nor did the Honour and Respect Men paid the side-man terminate in the other; for in honouring the one, they no way honour the other. The Parallel is very easy and natural: for as the two Men depended on the same Cause, and therefore the emaned Man was no way obliged to the other; so God's Nature having no Cause, his supposed Emanations must be as much without a Cause; for what is necessary to the Nature, is as much without a Cause as the Nature it self: therefore they could no more be obliged to God for their Divine Natures or their being Gods, than God is beholden to himself for his own Nature; since there was the same necessity of his emaning them as of existing himself, and consequently they are as independent as he and therefore have a right to be worshipped ultimately without reference to him, who can be no more said to give them that right than to give it himself. So that if our Author's Hypothesis be true, there are two Divine Natures or Gods, who enjoy all the Rights of their Godheads by as good a Title as the most High God himself; which if they are not three Gods in the highest Sense, it is impossible to imagine what are three Gods, and as such it is too notorious that all Trinitarians worship them. And tho they may with the help of Distinctions, without any difference, deny and wrangle about the plainest Contradictions; yet it would be in vain to deny matters of Fact, since it is evident they have three Objects of supream Worship, each of which they adore apart one from the other; which is either

either owning three Gods, or else owning themselves guilty of wilful Idolatry, in paying Supream Worship to what they do not believe to be God.

The reason why it is so necessary a Duty to believe the Unity of God, is, because we ought to have but one Object of supream Worship; whoever has more, destroys that Unity, and is guilty of Idolatry: For it is most evident that if the having one Object of Supream Worship, be the adoring of one God or supream Being; the having three such Objects, and the adoring each singly and by himself, is the Worship of three Gods. And in this point, whether it be lawful to have more than one Object of supream Worship, turns at present the whole controversy between the Trinitarians and Antitrinitarians. This was the Point I chiefly insisted on in my Letter; and this is what I still desire a serious answer to: For our Author's answer is a plain denial of Matter of Fact in their Worship, and a condemnation of those that so worship.

But to return, let the Relation between the Divine Persons be what it will, that is wholly *ad intra*, without any respect or reference to Creatures, who being equally oblig'd to each for their Beings and all the Blessings they do here or shall hereafter enjoy, (which are the things they ought to pay the highest Adoration for) ought to pay to each the highest; and consequently not worship one for the Sake of the other, but each for his own sake. And this is evident from this farther Reason: For suppose (as we very well may, if there are three Divine Natures) that two of them no way concern'd themselves with human Affairs, and that our Happiness or Misery no way depended upon them, there would be no reason why we should give them Divine Worship; but we ought to give it to him wholly from whom we have our Being, and expect our Happiness: and for the same Reason, if we are equally indebted to each, Justice and Gratitude will oblige us to pay to each equal acknowledgment, and to terminate our Devotions no more on one than on the others. And I challenge him to produce any Text of Scripture where there is any ground laid for the Worship of God, but it will agree to him that has unlimited Wisdom, Power and Goodness, *&c.* necessarily and eternally; and who bestows upon us our Life and Happiness: and what Worship we exhibit to God is certainly for his own Sake, and ultimately terminates in him. Thus if there be the same Reason for terminating our Worship on the Son as on the Father, it's absurd to do otherwise.

Nay, were the Trinitarians consistent with themselves, they ought to pay a thousand times more Acknowledgments to the Son than to the Father, since the Benefits they receive from the one, so much exceed the Benefits they receive from the other. For suppose one should owe to two Persons, to whom he was otherwise equally oblig'd, an immense Sum, without payment of which he must for

ever

ever ſuffer the Miſeries of an intolerable Impriſonment: would he not owe almoſt infinitely more to that Perſon who not only freely and generouſly forgave him himſelf, but even voluntarily paid to the other, though with loſs of his Life by an ignominious and painful Death, whatſoever their common Debter owed him; to whom he was no further oblig'd than for accepting the full Satisfaction of him that became his Surety. The application to the Father and the Son is very eaſy. As to the Father's ſending his Son, if the Son were not his Subject, and ſo he could command him, it could amount to no more than the Father's being willing to receive and accept of the Satisfaction the Son was as willing to pay in the ſtead of the Debter.

But let us ſuppoſe the Father, Son and H. Spirit as equal in Nature, ſo alſo equally obliging to us, and therefore each of them deſerving from us our whole Hearts and Souls, which it is impoſſible for us to give to more than one: we muſt wittingly and willingly by beſtowing them on one, either commit Sacrilege againſt the other two, or elſe by dividing them, give each but a Third of that which is wholly due to each of them, which would be Sacrilege againſt all three. Theſe are the Miſchiefs of our Author's Scheme of Religion, which it is impoſſible for him to avoid, but by owning with the Unitarians, that there is but one eternal neceſſary Nature, which is to be lov'd and honoured infinitely above all, and all others as his Creatures, but for his Sake and for his Glory.

And now let the Reader judg what great reaſon our Author has to triumph and inſult over his Antagoniſt, as he does all along, but more eſpecially *p.* 62,63,64. where amongſt other things he ſays, *he cannot but ſuſpect, it is the encreaſing or upholding of a Party*, &c. *which has very much the aſcendent of the Love of Truth. How may the Learned* Socrates *ſhame the ſelf-conceited Dogmatizers? How much rather would I be modeſt* Socrates, *than a Chriſtian who ſo leans to his own or his Party's Underſtanding?* Our Author is a little unlucky in ſo much mentioning *Socrates*, who choſe rather to embrace Death than our Author's beloved Hypotheſis of more than one Divine Nature, though that was the Religion of his Country and of the World: but I cannot blame him that ſets up for more than one ſuch Nature, (which appears to be contrary to the cleareſt Reaſon, as well as the moſt expreſs Scripture) for condemning others for leaning upon that Guide, which the one God has obliged them to follow, their own and not others Underſtanding. As to his ſuggeſtion of our having other Motives, not the Love of Truth, in oppoſing him, it is as groundleſs as uncharitable. For what deſign but the Love of Truth is it almoſt poſſible for a Man to have in defending a Doctrine, the doing of which expoſes him to be ruin'd by Penal Laws, and which is worſe, makes him an Object of the Averſion and Deteſtation of all Sects? But ſince our Author has given me the occaſion, I ſhall preſume

to

to ask him, how he can, not only own the Churches Faith, the Athanasian Creed, but (if he is of the Clergy) solemnly subscribe to it, and devoutly read it with all its damnatory Clauses, when it asserts but one Substance, one Uncreate, one Eternal, *&c.* and affirms the Holy Spirit to proceed from both the Father and the Son? the contrary of all which he asserts in his Propositions, and makes God the Father to have two Sons, both issuing from him by way of Emanation: and consequently the Son is not (as contrary to all Creeds as well as the Scripture) God's only Son.

But I shall conclude, only adding, that as it is contrary to the Genius of Religion, and is the way to eternize Errors, so it betrays a mean and low Spirit, to embrace an Opinion for the sake of a Party though never so venerable. And for my part, as I have been taught to call no Man Master but Christ, so I will own no other Name but that of Christian, and not of any distinguishing Party or Sect; and therefore will be chargeable with no controverted Doctrine further than what I expressly own; and that I do the Unity of the Nature of God, which is certainly of all Doctrines the most fundamental; and which I have abundantly shown from the Consideration of his Essence, his Attributes, his Works, and from the Duty and Worship we owe him.

POSTSCRIPT.

AND now I am at leisure to bestow a word or two upon my pert Adversary the Enquirer, who in an Advertisement to his *View of the Considerations*, charges me presently with *a double deplorable Impotency*; and that for no other reason, but saying the *Enquiry being so fully examined by an abler Hand, I shall only observe*, &c. but instead of answering and shewing the weakness of those few Observations I added, he only vents his spleen in studied Raillery, and contemptuous Expressions. But it's usual for Men highly conceited, when their weaknesses are expos'd, to grow angry. And I find the *calm* and *sober* Enquirer not exempt from the same Infirmity. He says, *I rave in my Dream in supposing he makes Parts in God*, or *three inadequate Gods*. And for reply says, *I appeal to that little Sense he has left himself, whether Power alone be God exclusively of Wisdom and Goodness? Then*, adds he, *'tis an inadequate or a not-compleat Notion of God, and then by his profound reasoning not eternal.* But is not this disowning and owning three inadequate Gods? For where is the Difference between three inadequate Gods, and three each of which is

God

God, and yet none of them is God in a compleat and adequate Senſe? And if the Father alone be no more God, than Power alone excluſive of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, he muſt certainly be God in a very inadequate Senſe: for neither Power, excluſive nor incluſive of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, is God, but all three Properties of the Father, who could not be ſaid to be eternal, except he had not only Power but all the Divine Attributes. I wonder with what aſſurance he can deny, that his Hypotheſis makes *three inadequate Gods*; ſince he ſays, *pag.* 47. *When you predicate the Name of God of any one of them* [*the Perſons*], *you herein expreſs a true but inadequate conception of God?* Now if you predicate the Name of *God* of every one of them ſingly, and then add them together in one Number, I appeal to the Enquirer's *great Senſe*, how far ſhort that comes of *three inadequate Gods*. And he further adds in the ſame Place, *As the Body is the Man not excluding the Soul, and the Soul the Man not excluding the Body, ſo each is God not excluding the others*; which at beſt is but making each to be God but in part, as the Body or the Soul is but *Man* in part; though with this difference, that each of the three Perſons is but the third of God, when the Body or the Soul is the Moiety of the Man. *For each of theſe conceived by it ſelf, are* (as he words it, *pag.* 51.) *individual Eſſences; but conceived together, they are the entire individual Eſſence of God.* Which I aver is deſtroying the Godhead of each, ſince each can be no more God, than the Third of an Eſſence can be the entire Eſſence it ſelf. And whether this is not making parts and compoſition in God, I refer the Reader to what I have ſaid, *pag.* 12. And this notion was by the Antients counted a kind of Sabellianiſm, *vid. Petav. Addn. ad Tom.* 2. *de Trin. pag.* 866. and it was by ſome of the Fathers called *Atheiſm*, *Id. L.* 1. *de Tr. C.* 6. §. 3. as obſerv'd by an Anſwer to the Animadverſions on the Dean of *P. &c. pag.* 164. And it is, by the acknowledgment of his own Party, Blaſphemy againſt God the Father, whom they all own to be God in the moſt perfect Senſe; and who, if he were not ſo, the addition of the other two would not make one God in the moſt perfect Senſe; becauſe he could not communicate to his Son and his Holy Spirit, thoſe Perfections he had not in himſelf. But to do him Juſtice, he ſeems, *pag.* 48. to be aſham'd of this Notion, and ſays, That the Father is the only true God, but withal adds, *THAT neither excludes the Son nor Spirit from being the true God.* [Not to take notice of the Contradiction, that the Father is the only true God, and yet others are the true God as well as he.] This is directly to deſtroy his Hypotheſis, and is aſſerting what, *pag.* 6. of his Enquiry, he ſays, *no Man that conſiders with ever ſo little Intention and Sincerity will offer at*, namely, *That they are three and one in the ſame reſpect*: for if the Father be the one only true God, and all three but the ſame one only true God, the

three

three and the one are the ſame in all reſpects whatever; and there can be no more difference between them than between the ſelf-ſame God and himſelf. So that if each ſingle Perſon be God but in an inadequate Senſe, the Trinity muſt be ſo too, becauſe that is no more than what each Perſon is, the true God. And, *p.* 78. of *the View*, he is forc'd to own that the Father is God in the moſt adequate and perfect Senſe of the Word, and conſequently all three can be no more. Thus the three and the one are the ſame in the ſame reſpect: and if there is more in the three in any reſpect whatever, than in the Father, it muſt either be a Perfection or an Imperfection; if a Perfection, the Father is not God in the moſt perfect ſenſe of the Word; if an Imperfection, then the Father is God in a more perfect Senſe than all three together. But I will ſay no more on this Point, ſince I have in my Letter fully proved that neither Son nor Holy Spirit can be the ſame God with the Father, and conſequently if there is but one God, the Father is that one God excluſively both of Son and Spirit.

I cannot but remark, that this calm Enquirer has no fixt or certain Faith of what the three are, which he ſays, are in the Godhead. Sometimes he is no more a Trinitarian than thoſe he writes againſt, ſuppoſing the three in the Godhead are Wiſdom, Power and Goodneſs: ſometimes he's a Modaliſt, as, *page* 48. where he ſays, Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt are each the true God, becauſe each of them communicates in the Godhead, which is the Cant of the Modaliſts; and is as much as to ſay, the Father, Son and H. Ghoſt communicate in the Godhead, or in Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt. Sometimes he talks like a Realiſt, in ſuppoſing it poſſible, though not certain, that the three are three individual Eſſences; and this laſt ſeems to be his more ſettled Opinion, becauſe he talks ſo much of the *mutual Complacency* and *delicious Society* that is between them. Which is to make God a collective Name of ſeveral intelligent Beings converſing together. Which Notion as to one part of it well agrees with that of the old Pagans; who as well as our Author could not think a Divine Being abſolutely happy in it ſelf; or (to uſe his expreſſions) *had no guſtful Idea of a happy State in meer eternal Solitude*, therefore did ſuppoſe *a delicious Society* of Gods, ſolacing one another *with everlaſting Harmony, and mutual Complacency into higheſt Delectation*: but as to the other, they could never ſuppoſe this delicious Society, each of which was one God, to be ſtill but one and the ſame God.

He ſays, "His (meaning me) con-
"fidently taking it for granted on all
"Hands, that *all Infinites are equal*,
"ſhews his little compaſs of Thought,
"and how unacquainted he is with
"the Difficulties of a Controverſy,
"wherein yet he will be ſo over-
"meddleſom, *Qui pauca reſpicit &c.*
"But who ſo bold as —? I challenge him to produce any one that ever ſuppos'd ſomewhat more than *Infi-*

nite, which must be, if Infinites are unequal: and if one Infinite be less than another, the less would ceale to be Infinite, by having a bound or end put to it. And there would be no Difficulty (which he there hints at) in supposing unequal parcels of Matter to be divided each into infinite Parts, if they could be divided into unequal Parts. But I would willingly know, whether it is a Finite or an Infinite Inequality that is between Infinites. But I have spoken sufficiently of this Matter already, and so I have of *necessary Emanations*.

He says of me, *He did not need when he writ, to have abandon'd all Logick and common Sense, that would have told him, Relata sunt simul natura.* But why that Reflection on me, except it be that, §. 55. (which is the only Place he can mean) I expresly say, Relatives cannot exist but at the same time? If I had asserted a First in Nature in contradiction to Time, I should have had as little Honesty as he supposes I have Sense, in making use of a distinction of which I had no Idea; nor can they who use it, explain to others what they mean by it. And now having taken notice of all his Flurts and Misrepresentations, I take leave of him as civilly as he of me. *Good Night Mr. Enquirer.*

But now having (as I suppose) sufficiently maintain'd my Reflections, I shall address my self to the Reader, and mind him, that not only the Real and Nominal Trinitarians differ one from another, but the Real among themselves, as these two Authors I have been considering, and the Nominal among themselves; and every one is dissatisfied with all other Explications besides his own, as contradictory, absurd, or unintelligible, and inconsistent with either the Unity or the Trinity: and they attack one another with Arguments borrow'd from their common Adversary the Unitarian, which every one counts valid against the rest. Whence I cannot but remark, how wonderful the Power of Prejudice and Education is, whereby it comes to pass, that though they cannot reconcile their Father-God, and Son-God, and Holy-Ghost-God, with the Unity of God; and though both Scripture and Reason do most expresly and clearly assert, that there is but one only God the Father of all; yet they cannot quit their inveterable Doctrine. And though the Nominals plainly perceive the Realists guilty of Polytheism, yet they join with them in the same Form of Worship, wherein they adore equally with them three Divine Persons under distinct and different Characters, each by himself as one entire perfect God. And though the Ignoramus-Trinitarians cannot satisfy themselves with any explication, yet they think themselves still oblig'd to profess in words a Doctrine they cannot in their own Minds make consistent with it self. But I shall ask these Gentlemen, whether God requires impossibilities of them, or whether it is possible for them to believe what they cannot apprehend but inconsistent with, and con-

contradictory to it ſelf; or whether the Chriſtian Religion, which all grant is plain and eaſy in its Fundamentals, as ſuted to the ſimplicity of the bulk of Mankind, can chiefly be built upon a Doctrine ſo unintelligible, that the moſt Learned Men of that Perſwaſion for above Thirteen hundred Years, have in vain laboured to make it intelligible and conſiſtent with it ſelf; and ſober Men eſteem it as vain an attempt as ſquaring the Circle, or finding out the Philoſophers-ſtone, *&c?*

But ſince my preſent Buſineſs has been with the real Trinitarians, I ſhall conclude with an Argument of *Athenagoras* a moſt Learned Writer of the ſecond Century, in his Apology for the Chriſtians to *Marcus Antoninus*. Which being urged againſt a Plurality of Gods, is as ſtrong againſt a plurality of Divine Natures, Eſſences, *&c.* And it ſeems to be but an abſtract of what I have more at large ſaid againſt my Adverſaries; which I quote not for his Authority, but for the Reaſon of it. Tranſlated into Engliſh it runs thus:

" Pray conſider (ſaith he) the Rea-
" ſons why we affirm, that from E-
" ternity there was but one God the
" Creator of the Univerſe. If from
" Eternity there have been two or
" more Gods, either they are united
" in one and the ſame Eſſence, or
" each of them has a diſtinct Eſſence
" to himſelf. But for them to ex-
" iſt in one and the ſame Eſſence, is
" impoſſible; for though they ſhould
" be *one* in their denomination of
" Gods, yet as begotten and unbe-
" gotten they muſt be different: ſee-
" ing what is begotten reſembles its
" Parent, whereas the unbegotten is
" like nothing, being neither made
" of, nor for any thing. But if it
" ſhould be ſaid that many Gods are
" *one*, as the Hand, Foot, and Eye
" are but Parts of the ſame Body,
" *Socrates* will tell you, that what is
" compounded of and diviſible into
" Parts, is both made and corrupti-
" ble: But God is uncreated, im-
" paſſible, and undiviſible, there-
" fore not conſiſting of Parts. But
" if every one has a diſtinct Exiſtence,
" where ſhall the other or the reſt be,
" whilſt he that made this World
" ſurrounds and governs the Crea-
" tures which he form'd? If the Ar-
" chitect of this Earth (which is of
" a Spherical Figure, inclos'd with-
" in the Celeſtial Orbs) be over his
" Works, and rule them by his Pro-
" vidence; what Place ſhall we aſſign
" to another God? Not *in* this World,
" for it belongs to another; nor *over*
" the World, for he that made it, is
" above it: And if he be not in the
" World nor over the World, where
" can he be above the World or
" God? Is it in another World? If
" ſo, then he is nothing to us that
" governs not our World; nor can
" his Power be great, being confin'd
" to a certain Place. If therefore he
" is neither in nor over this World,
" nor any other, (for there is no
" other, ſeeing all Parts of the
" Univerſe make but one World,
" whereof the entire extent is fill'd
" by

" by its Maker) therefore he is no " where, for there is no Place for " him. But ſuppoſing him ſome- " where, pray to what purpoſe? " plainly to none at all, *&c.* It will " be ſaid, perhaps to provide for us; " but certainly he cannot provide for " thoſe he has not made. It follows " therefore that if he created no- " thing, nor provides, nor can be " confin'd to a Place; there is no o- " ther God at all, but one from Eter- " nity, the only Creator of the Uni- " verſe.

FINIS.

221830 (no.4)

A

REPLY

TO

The Second Defence

OF THE

XXVIII PROPOSITIONS,

Said to be wrote in Anſwer to a *Socinian Manuſcript.*

BY

The AUTHOR of that MS. no Socinian, but a Chriſtian and Unitarian.

Nullius addictus jurare in verba Magiſtri.

LONDON,
Printed in the Year MDCXCV.

A REPLY to the SECOND DEFENCE *of the XXVIII Propoſitions, ſaid to be wrote in Anſwer to a* Socinian Manuſcript.

SIR,

I NOW find by Notice in the *Gazette*, that your Learned and Worthy Friend, whoſe Name you concealed from me, is the Lord Biſhop of *Gloceſter*. He has publiſhed an Anſwer (which he calls, *A Second Defence of his Propoſitions*) to a private Manuſcript, which he calls *Socinian*. Which MS. to excuſe his not publiſhing it, he tells his Reader he had returned to you, and had it not by him, nor a Copy of it. He ſaith he collected the Subſtance of it: I believe what he thought the Subſtance; but how ſhall the Reader judg of that? ſince as a great Maſter tells us, The Context, the Stile, and the Phraſeology of an Author muſt be well conſidered by one that means to underſtand him perfectly. But it ſeems he was not willing to loſe an Opportunity to expoſe a Heretick, tho' he ſtrain'd Civility in ſo doing. In the mean time, my MS. gave occaſion to encreaſe the Number of his explanatory Propoſitions. But after this farther Explanation of his Explanation, he is as obſcure as ever, tho' that (to deal ingenuouſly) is rather his Misfortune than his Fault; for there are ſome things which will never be explain'd while the World ſtands: ſuch as *neceſſary and eternal Emanation, Divine Fecundity, the Difference between Order of Time and Order of Nature.*

One thing, before I begin my Reply, let me acquaint you with: I am adviſed to paſs by whatever does not concern the Cauſe, to bear the Imputation of affected Pœdantry, Ignorance and Arrogance. Contemptuous Charges enough to exerciſe the Patience of a well-compos'd Man, and urge one of my Make to take out Letters of *Repriſal*; at leaſt by way of Self-defence, to ſay ſomething like that of *Tully*, *Non video in hâc meâ mediocritate ingenii quid deſpicere poſſit Antonius.* But I will ſubmit my Reſentment to my Adviſer, as obedient Sons are wont their Faith to their Mother; and that not only for the Reaſon aim'd at by my Friend, but alſo out of Reſpect to my Adverſary, (and therein I ſhall pleaſe you) whom I believe to

be as you character him, one of the moſt deſerving of his Order. But yet I beg leave to tell you, that I do not hold my ſelf oblig'd by this Promiſe, to forbear expoſing the Weakneſs of an unconcluding Argument, or ſetting two contrary Sayings to ſtare one another in the face: but from all Revilings, from fooliſh Words, deſigned to leſſen his Lordſhip's juſt Eſteem, I ſhall religiouſly forbear. If I ſprinkle Salt, it ſhall not grieve his Perſon.

P. 1. of the Defence, *&c.*] whereas I had affirmed that the Trinitarians had in vain tried their Strength againſt the Unitarians; his Lordſhip anſwers, *There's no doubt of it, if their Adverſaries may be Judges.* I now affirm it, if the Trinitarians *themſelves* be Judges; for the *Modaliſts* will not allow the Hypotheſis of the *Realiſts*, and the Realiſts deſpiſe theirs: and then again, the *Ignoramus*, or Myſtery-trinitarians, eſteem the Methods taken by both theſe Parties, not only vain and fruitleſs, as to the refuting the Unitarians; but alſo dangerous, and likely to overthrow their own great Article; while both theſe Parties join, and with full conſent condemn the *Ignoramus*-trinitarians, who preſs the Belief of a Trinity in the Godhead, but cannot ſay what is meant by it. What the modern Unitarians have taught in their late Tracts concerning this controverted Article, ſome or other of their Adverſaries teach as well as they. For example, the Unitarians have taught, that if by *Perſons* are meant *Relations*, *Capacities*, or *Reſpects* of God to his Creatures, then there may be more Perſons than 3 in the Godhead; becauſe God hath the Capacities, Reſpects or Relations of a *Judg*, of an *Oeconomus*, or Provider, *&c.* They have taught, that a Mode or a Poſture cannot be a Perſon; that a Mode cannot be in God, becauſe Modes are changeable, and God is not. They look upon it as an inconceivable Extravagancy, to fancy that God in one Mode or Poſture, begat himſelf in another; and breath'd forth his Self, by the help of his begotten Self, in a proceeding third-Self: And as to all theſe things, Dean *Sh—k*, Mr. *H--w*, and the Bp. of *Gl.* have the ſame Senſe as the Unitarians. The Unitarians have taught, that there are not 3 Perſons in the proper Senſe of that word, not 3 diſtinct Eſſences, Natures, Spirits, Minds, or intelligent Beings, in the Unity of the Godhead; but that it's down-right Tritheiſm to ſay it, and equally idolatrous with the Polytheiſm of the Heathens. Dr. *S--th* teaches ſo likewiſe; Dr. *Wallis* is of the ſame Opinion; and the famous Bps. of *Worceſter* and *Sarum*, who will not declare plainly their own Senſe, both declare againſt this. The Unitarians have taught, that that Article, which is propos'd to be believ'd as neceſſary to Salvation, is capable of being explained; and that it's very unjuſt, not to ſay ridiculous, to require Men to believe words, whereof no certain Signification can be given: Now if Dean *Sherlock*, with all the Realiſts, and his Friend Dr. *South*, with all the Modaliſts, were not of the Mind of the Unitarians in this Point; would they,

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think you, take ſuch Pains to explain the Article, each after his own particular Manner? Whatſoever ſingle Affirmation you arraign the Unitarians upon, upon the ſame you arraign a Majority of Trinitarians. For I think I may reckon, that no one of the three chief Diviſions, is equal to the other two. In ſhort, the Majority of the Church muſt be guilty of Hereſy with the Unitarians, or the Unitarians muſt be Orthodox with them. Thus, I think, I have juſtified that Cenſure, *The Trinitarians have in vain tried their Strength againſt their Adverſaries; and that not thoſe Adverſaries, but even the Trinitarians themſelves being Judges.*

His Lordſhip ſeems angry that I ſhould be amaz'd at his diſtinguiſhing between *Intelligible* and *Comprehenſible:* But that I have ſince conſider'd the Neceſſities which a good Man may be put to, in the Defence of a bad Cauſe, I ſhould be more amaz'd at his Lordſhip's Defence of that idle Diſtinction. I have many things to ſay in anſwer, but becauſe I hear you are not pleas'd with this fruitleſs Contention, I will wave it; and only tell you, that ſince his Lordſhip ſent me to the Dictionary to learn that *comprehendere* ſignifies ſomething that *intelligere* doth not, I put that Labour on one of my Children, and I'll take his word, that the metaphorical Signification of *comprehendo*, is juſt the ſame with *intelligo*.

P. 6. l. 9. his Lordſhip has an obſcure Period; in which, if there be any Meaning, it muſt be this, *That he holds it poſſible to underſtand the Manner how Three are One; elſe he would not have offer'd at an Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity agreeable to natural Reaſon.* And what Account has he given of the Manner? why, in *pr.* 15. of 21. but 22. of 28. he declares, that *there is* an *UNCONCEIVABLY cloſe, and inſeparable Union in Will and Nature between them,* [the 3 numerically diſtinct Perſons.] And is this all he knows of the Manner how they are one? *i. e.* after ſuch a Manner as cannot be known nor told? Well! thoſe Sophiſts (in rebuke of whom *Socrates* profeſſed, all that he knew was, that he knew nothing) were not ſo unreaſonable as to make the Inconceivableneſs of the *Manner*, wherein a Doctrine might be true, a Proof that they knew the Manner in which it was true.

I ſaid, that *Three are One* is not true in a Senſe diſagreeable to Reaſon: The Explication which he gives how 3 are 1, is diſagreeable to Reaſon, and therefore not intelligible, not comprehenſible, not true. The latter part he anſwers with his uſual Diſtinction, *Tho' intelligible, yet not therefore comprehenſible:* But I pray him to tell me, why a *Prop.* not diſagreeble to Reaſon, ſhould not be capable of being *compleatly underſtood*, when it is compleatly revealed.

I ſaid, 2. *He that underſtands the Truth of a Prop. underſtands the Manner in which it is true*, &c. I now apply it thus: He that underſtands the Truth of this Prop. *There are three Perſons in one God*, underſtands the Man-

Manner how that can be, or the Senſe in which it is true; and if he does not underſtand the Manner or Senſe, then, let him pretend what he will, he does not underſtand the Truth of the *Prop.* and if not underſtanding the Manner or Senſe how the *Prop.* is true, he profeſſes to believe it; then it's manifeſt he takes it on Authority, believes it in deference to others.

Prop. 2. *That Being which wants any one Perfection, cannot be abſolutely or infinitely perfect.* Upon this I obſerved this Conſequence, *That Chriſt was God only in a metaphorical Senſe.* Nor ſhall he ever be able to avoid the Conſequence; for the ſtrict Senſe of a Word or Phraſe is the proper Senſe of it; and every Senſe beſides the ſtrict and proper, is metaphorical.

Prop. 4. *God the Father alone [ſtrictly ſpeaking] is a Being abſolutely perfect, becauſe he alone is ſelf-exiſtent; and all other Beings, even the Son and H. Ghoſt, are from him.* He ſeems to allow my former Cenſure: I now obſerve, That his Hypotheſis is unluckily built on vain Diſtinctions. Indeed he could tell me, that *Intelligible* and *Comprehenſible* was an old Diſtinction, and very common; but now he brings forth one, which is wholly new, which no Man ever us'd before him. It is *this*: *ABSOLUTELY PERFECT in the ſtricteſt Senſe, and ABSOLUTELY PERFECT with reference to the Nature of a Being.* Of which (to be as free with him as he with me) I can make no better Senſe than this; That a Being which hath all the Perfections of its Nature, may in ſome ſort be ſaid to have all Perfections without Reſtriction, all whatſoever. That a Magiſtrate may be ſaid to exerciſe all Power without Limitation, when he exerciſes all that was delegated to him. But if one Being can be more abſolutely perfect than another, I would fain know why one cannot be more omniſcient, more omnipotent than another; more infinite, more eternal, both *à parte poſt*, and *à parte ante*. If a Man would ſtudy to reſtrain a word of ſome Latitude, he could not do it more effectually than his Lordſhip has reſtrain'd the Predicate *perfect*, by the Adjunct *abſolutely*. Suppoſing the word *Perfect* may be taken in a ſtricter and a looſer Senſe, yet the Phraſe *abſolutely Perfect*, cannot poſſibly admit of any other Senſe--Having all Perfections. Every Man underſtands this Term *abſolutely* ſo as to imply, that nothing more than what thereby is, can be predicated of the Subject. But if this Diſtinction muſt paſs in this Controverſy againſt the common Senſe of Mankind; then let the equivocating Jeſuits, who were formerly content with very childiſh *Salvo's*, to take off the Infamy of a Lie, learn the way of diſtinguiſhing, worth a Volume of their old mental Reſervations, when the Treaſon they ſolemnly diſavow, is unluckily diſcovered.

Prop. 9. *A Being which hath all the Divine Perfections that are capable of being communicated, may be properly ſaid to be eſſentially GOD upon the account of thoſe Perfections, or to*

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be indued with the Divine Nature. It ſeems I was ſo rude as to call this *a groſs Prop. contrary to Senſe and Reaſon,* and to all that the Propoſer had rationally advanc'd before; nay, I was ſo perverſe as to prove it by Induction of Particulars. I refer to my Animadverſions. His Lordſhip here complains, 1. That *I us'd too many words:* but the Nature of the Argument required them. 2. He tells me, *he had no ſuch Expreſſion as, DERIVES it ſelf from God:* But he has a bad Memory; for in his 3*d Prop.* he ſays, *'Tis an Abatement of a boundleſs Perfection, not to be originally in him who hath it, but DERIVATIVELY.* 3. He affirms that I am a little injurious, in repreſenting him ſaying, that *the Son and H. Ghoſt have only SOME Perfections; whereas I ought to have repreſented him as ſaying,* that *they have all that are capable of being communicated.* But I'll juſtify it, that I ought to have repreſented him as I have done; for 'tis my Buſineſs to expoſe, not to cover the Weakneſs of his Arguments, and I have not miſrepreſented him; for if the Son and H. Spirit have not abſolutely *all* Perfections, then they have but *ſome:* But how comes it to paſs that they have no more than they have? That's nothing to my Purpoſe, let him look to that. Incapacity to be greater, cannot ſurely make a rational Being as great as the greateſt. I come next to conſider how his Lordſhip has anſwered 4 Queſtions which I put.

1. *Does the Divine Nature comprehend all Perfections, or can it want one or two of the chiefeſt, and be ſtill the ſame Divine Nature?* To this, thus he; *Self-exiſtence is a Perfection relating immediately to the Father's Exiſtence, not to his Nature or Eſſence.* I reply, that this is not anſwering the Queſtion, but a very ſorry ſhuffling it off; for let the Perfection of Self-exiſtence belong to what he pleaſes, yet I hope it is a Perfection; and if the Divine Nature comprehends all Perfections, that Nature which does not comprehend all, muſt not be the Divine Nature. 2. If Self-exiſtence (as he teaches) relates immediately to the Father's Exiſtence, and (as he ſeems to mean) be but as good as no Perfection; yet to be firſt Original of all things, and Independent, muſt relate to his Nature, or none of all the reſt relate to his Nature. The Nature of a Being is that *by which he is, that which he is:* and if you abſtract from the Divine Nature, Independence, and being the firſt Original of all things, you do not conceive God to be that which he is. 3. Even the Manner of God's Exiſtence (as his Lordſhip once phras'd it) belongs to his Eſſence; nay, it is the very fundamental Notion of a God. Whatever Excellencies you aſcribe to a rational Being without ſelf-exiſtence, you raiſe him not above the Character of a moſt excellent Creature; nay more, you cannot aſcribe infinite Perfections to any but the Self-exiſtent God: For his Lordſhip grants, that the Perfections of all other Creatures are in them but *derivatively,* and by being ſo, receive Abatement. But if he can make theſe two things conſiſt, I will give him

him this Gift, he ſhall never be able to contradict himſelf while he breathes. 4. Tho' he will not allow Self-exiſtence to belong to the Eſſence of God; yet he ſays, that it ſpeaks a more excellent Manner of Exiſtence, peculiar to the Father. I argue then, If the Father does exiſt after a more excellent Manner than the Son; then he is a more excellent Perſon than the Son, and has a more excellent Nature: even as created *Adam* (it is his Lordſhip's Simily) is more excellent than any of the Sons of Men. And if the more excellent Nature of the Father be not another ſort of Nature than the leſs excellent Nature of the Son, who can help it? But then I'll tell him, that One abſolutely perfect God with all Perfections; all and every, Self-exiſtence, Being the firſt Original, and Independence not excluded; and his 2 Gods not abſolutely perfect, but as perfect as 2 Gods can be, that are not abſolutely perfect; is a Dream, which would make ſport for any Man, that has not more Reverence for his Vertue than his Reaſoning.

But his Lordſhip is poſitive that the Nature of the Son may be a neceſſary Nature, and uncreated, for all that I can object, or he has ſaid: Well! I will try that; I object that the Nature of the Son is not ſaid to be *neceſſary* or *uncreated* in Scripture. He offers no Reaſons why it ſhould be thought ſo; I will produce ſome why it ſhould not. 1. Becauſe there can be but one numerically neceſſary Exiſtent: Dr. *Cudworth*, tho' a Trinitarian, could not but own this, *p.* 200. *The true and proper Idea of God, is a Being abſolutely perfect: abſolute Perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, and is that alone to which neceſſary Exiſtence is eſſential, and of which it is demonſtrable.* The Nature of the Son cannot be uncreated, becauſe there can be but One numerical uncreated Nature. Indeed the Athanaſian Creed pronounceth, *The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, the H. Ghoſt uncreate:* but the Compiler did not believe it; for he determines, *not Three uncreate, but One uncreate.* His Lordſhip hints ſometimes, that the Nature of the Father, Son, and H. Ghoſt is ſpecifically the ſame; ſometimes that it is cloſely, inſeparably, unconceivably the ſame: but he conſtantly teaches, that their Natures are numerically diſtinct: and now if every one of them is uncreate, it undeniably follows, that there are 3 numerical, diſtinct, uncreated Natures: But this methinks he ſhould ſcarcely venture to aſſert, if it be but out of Reverence to the Athanaſian Creed, how much ſoever he may be tempted to treſpaſs upon evident Principles of Reaſon. 2. Neither the Son, nor the H. Ghoſt, is a neceſſary Nature; becauſe a neceſſary Nature muſt be alſo ſelf-exiſtent, and independent. That Being which exiſts neceſſarily, could exiſt from no other: but the Son exiſts from the Father, therefore does not exiſt neceſſarily. He will ſay, The Son exiſts from the Father by eternal neceſſary Emanation; what that is, I ſhall preſently enquire: I argue on, If a Being could exiſt neceſſarily, then

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It would not depend on God for its Exiſtence; but the Son (according to his Lordſhip) does depend on the Father for his Exiſtence, therefore he does not exiſt neceſſarily. If the Nature of the Son were neceſſary, as is the Nature of the Father, no reaſon could be aſſigned why the Father ſhould not as much depend on the Son, as the Son on the Father. In ſhort, two neceſſary Natures there cannot be: but if there were, they would both be independent.

To my 2*d* Queſtion, he bids you, Sir, read again what he ſaid to the former; I have done ſo, and find I have not cenſur'd theſe words: *God the Father's Exiſtence being without a Cauſe, doth not make him to have another ſort of Nature, from the Son and H. Ghoſt.*] Here it is implied, that the Nature of the Son, and of the H. Ghoſt, had a Cauſe; whereas the Nature of God had none: Will not this paſs for a ſufficient Character, to diſtinguiſh them as different Natures? I'm ſure, no two different Natures which he can name, do differ half ſo much as a Nature that had a Cauſe, and a Nature that had not. And then again, To have a Cauſe, and to be uncreated: if that be not a Contradiction, I am ſatisfied he may talk backward and forward ſecurely.

My 3*d* Queſtion, *Can a Being that depends on God, be properly ſaid to be eſſentially that God on whom it depends?* He anſwers, *Such a Being can be properly ſaid to be eſſentially that God in one Senſe, but cannot in another*; i. e. *can have an Eſſence of the ſame kind, tho' not the ſame numerical One.* But by his favour, an Eſſence of the ſame kind, can at moſt but make a Being to be *a God*, not make him to be *that God* on whom himſelf depends. If a Being can be *that* God which depends on another; and *that very* God alſo, on whom himſelf depends, then ſuch Being may at once be Two Gods; and ſo the Second Perſon in the Trinity is the Father that caus'd the Son to be, and the Son that was caus'd by the Father. Thus by his Lordſhip's Anſwer to my 3*d* Queſtion, it appears he holds the Three Perſons to be *One God*, as having an Eſſence of the *ſame kind*; but to be Three numerical Gods. And to make his Polytheiſm look as heatheniſhly as poſſible, he ſaith, *p. 19. that the individual Nature of the Father, is not a Divine Nature more truly than* that *of the Two other Perſons.* And then Self-exiſtence, Being the firſt Original, and Independence, ſignify much.

His Lordſhip makes the ſame Anſwer to my 4*th Prop.* as he did to my 2*d*; *i. e.* he has anſwered it already. What can be more extravagant than this Fancy, on which the Weight of more Hypotheſes than one depends; *viz.* that Angels exiſt by *voluntary Creation*, but the Son and H. Ghoſt by *neceſſary Emanation?* It's common with the Trinitarians, to uſe theſe Terms, *Generation, Emanation, Proceſſion:* it's common alſo with the moſt eminent of them to acknowledg, that it's a difficult Thing to underſtand, a dangerous Curioſity to enquire,

quire, a bold Preſumption to determine, wherein theſe Terms differ: and the Reaſon is, (tho' they are aſham'd to own it) becauſe they know not what they would have their Terms ſignify.

In common ſpeaking we know what is meant by To generate or beget, To emanate or flow from, To proceed; To go or come forth: but thoſe Terms cannot be applied to the Father, Son, and H. Ghoſt, in that natural obvious Senſe; why then ſhould they be applied to them at all, when no Man can diſtinctly ſay what they are to ſignify? 'Tis granted we have not an adequate Conception of God; there may be ſomething in his Nature, whereof we have no juſt Idea: but that which we cannot underſtand, how can we talk of? How can we form Propoſitions of Things out of the reach of our Knowledg? But by this one particular Term *EMANATION*, his Lordſhip will venture to ſay, This is what is meant, A *more excellent Way of Exiſtence than by Creation*; and to his Term *Emanation*, he adds this Epithet *Neceſſary*: ſo then, the more excellent Way of Exiſtence than by Creation, is neceſſary Exiſtence; and ſo it is: but then the Son does not neceſſarily exiſt. That Being which could not but be, ever was; and that Being which ever was, could be from no other. But becauſe his Lordſhip is wont ſarcaſtically to deride my Arguing, (who am indeed an obſcure and unlearned little Fellow) tho' for ought he knows, I may equal the very great Abilities of that *DYING MARTYR* (yet a Trinitarian to my Knowledg) who ſtarves, to the Reproach of this Nation; to whom the envious *Jovian* allow'd the Praiſe of *Mediocrity*: I ſhall therefore ſeek a little ſhelter from Authority; that his Lordſhip may not *renounce his Senſes, if any Man of Senſe be of his Mind.* The Author I am going to quote is Dr. *Cudworth*, a good Man, and very near of his Lordſhip's Make too; who in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, contradicts his own and his Lordſhip's Hypotheſis, as plainly and liberally as heart can wiſh; *p.* 210. *Self-exiſtence and neceſſary Exiſtence, are eſſential to a perfect Being, and to none elſe.* But his Lordſhip teaches, that the latter, and not the former, is eſſential to a perfect Being; and that the Son is abſolutely perfect (tho' not in his ſtricteſt Senſe) without Self-exiſtence, and that the Self-exiſtence which belongs to the Father does not belong to his Eſſence: tho' he who can ſeparate Self-exiſtence from the Father's Eſſence, may with as much Reaſon deny the Exiſtence of his Eſſence; for the Father is as certainly ſelf-exiſtent, as he is exiſtent.

Cudworth again, *p.* 726. *Nothing could exiſt of it ſelf from Eternity, naturally and neceſſarily, but that which contains neceſſary and eternal Self-exiſtence in its Nature.* I am apt to believe, this Author put in that Phraſe *of it ſelf* to ſave an Emanation or two: but it will not do it; for he conſtantly makes Self-exiſtence and neceſſary Exiſtence inſeparable Perfections.

ſections. And *p.* 748. he ſpeaks full and home againſt his own and the Bp. of *Glouceſter*'s Tritheiſm, in theſe words: *Tho' it be certain that ſomething did exiſt of it ſelf neceſſarily*, from all Eternity; yet it is certain likewiſe, *that there can be but one ſuch thing, Neceſſity of Exiſtence being eſſential to no more.* Now if Neceſſity of Exiſtence be eſſential but to *One*, I pray, Sir, what will become of his Lordſhip's *neceſſary Emanations? Cudw.* p. 764. *Becauſe ſomething did certainly exiſt of it ſelf from Eternity unmade, therefore alſo is there actually a neceſſary exiſtent Being.* The Doctor proves the neceſſary Exiſtence of a Being, from its Exiſting of it ſelf from Eternity; *i.e.* from its neceſſary Exiſtence, as I had done before. Let the Reader judg if it be not a good Argument.

P. 13. his Lordſhip ſays, *A Creature communicating its Nature, does not forgo its own individual Nature*, [but neither does he communicate his own individual Nature] *nor any part thereof.* Here I beg his Pardon; for the Creature does forgo a part, a ſeminal part thereof; the bodily Subſtance of the *Fœtus* is by the wonderful Providence of God, made from the bodily Subſtance of the Parents; and as far as the bodily Subſtance of Men may be call'd *their Nature*, they waſte their Nature, to produce their like. How Souls are produced, he ſays not, neither I. But hitherto he has not offer'd any thing to make me retract my Aſſertion; That we have no other Notion of the word *Communicate*, but *to impart* or *give*; and what one Perſon doth *impart* or *give*, of any *eſſential and ſingular thing, THAT himſelf hath not, but he hath it to whom it is given.* Who queſtions the Power of God to generate his Like? He made Man in his own Likeneſs, endued him with rational Faculties, with noble Excellencies of Mind: but the Unitarians do not ſee, how God can communicate all his infinite Perfections; for that is to communicate himſelf, to beget himſelf, to multiply himſelf; which deſerves a harder Name than I can give it.

Prop. 10. " There ſeems to be no " Contradiction, nor the leaſt Ab- " ſurdity in aſſerting, that God is a- " ble to communicate every one of " his Perfections, except thoſe of " Self-exiſtence, and being the firſt " Original of all things.] Againſt this, I did affirm, (and ſee no Cauſe I have to retract) that for the ſame Reaſon, as Self-exiſtence, and being the firſt Original of all things, are incommunicable; for the very ſame, Infinite Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs were incommunicable alſo: and to make good this Affirmation, 'twas proper for me to declare why the former were incommunicable, that the Reader might judg wherein the latter were not ſo likewiſe, for the Reaſon alledg'd. All that his Lordſhip has to offer, is, that I attempt to prove a ſelf-evident Principle: but that's not ſo great a Fault I hope, as to attempt to prove an evident Contradiction; ſuch as, *That two Perſons have all Perfections neceſſary to eſſen-*

tiate a perfect God, tho' they have not absolutely all Perfections; That God the Father has more Perfections than are necessary to essentiate a perfect God; That the Father who has more, and the Son and H. Spirit, who have just so many Perfections, as are necessary to essentiate a perfect God, are still all Three of them but One God. But supposing I have us'd *in re non dubiâ argumentis non necessariis*, in a plain Case needless Arguments; yet he cannot charge me to have obscur'd the self-evident Principle: but I defy his Lordship, to illustrate his Obscurities. I proceed in my Defence, Whereas it's very absurd and contradictious to suppose more than One self-existent; so it is *equally* absurd and contradictious to suppose more than One infinitely powerful, wise, and good Being. And by *equally* I mean, as *evidently* so. Nor am I the only Man that will say this, as I shall prove presently; tho' he pretends to be sure of the contrary, and civilly tells me, I *cannot think so, let me* say *what I will.* I make him but this temperate Return; I will suspect his Understanding sooner than his Veracity. I said farther, that Infinite Power, Infinite Wisdom, Infinite Goodness go together, and may all of them as well as either of them, be in all Beings whatsoever, as well as in more Beings than one. He replies, that this as much needs to be prov'd, as that which it is brought to prove; and that my only Answer is like to be, It must be taken on the Authority of my Lord of *Canterbury*. But then by my Lord of *Glocester*'s Favour, I am not the only Man that will say, *more than One infinitely powerful, is as absurd as more than One self-existent.* And if the Judgment of that Lord of *Cant.* (which he passes with unbecoming Contempt) is of no value, I will laugh at the Man who thinks to credit his Discourse with the Authority of *Athanasius*, or the Nicene Fathers; Men moderately skill'd perhaps in brangling Philosophy, amus'd with mysterious Platonism, and full of themselves: whereas the Name of *TILLOTSON* shall be ever *bless'd*, if sound Learning and wondrous Modesty, true Piety and just Moderation do not grow out of fashion and esteem. To that Passage I cited out of his Sermon on 1 *Tim.* 2. 5. my Lord of *Glocester* thinks it enough to answer, that he had not the Sermon by him, and I had not distinguish'd his words. A fair Answer! I will now cite them in a distinguishing Character. P. 13. *Absolute Perfection is the most essential Notion which Mankind hath always had of God, and necessarily supposes Unity; 'tis essential to the Notion of an absolutely perfect Being, that all Perfections be united in him: to imagine some Perfections in one, and some in another,* [*i. e.* in God the Father, which are not in God the Son] *is a Contradiction to the most natural and easy Notion Men have of a God*; i. e. *that be is a Being, in whom all Perfections do meet and are united.* Now had his Grace been a Prophet, he could not more directly have pointed his words

words againſt the Hypotheſis of the 28 Propoſitions. And if his Grace was ſo honeſt as to believe the Truth of what he affirmed, why may not I who have ſaid the ſame things in other words, believe what I have ſaid? That odious Inſinuation to the contrary, muſt needs reflect hardly upon his Lordſhip, rather than on me; for I will be his Proſelyte, if the major Part of the Trinitarians do not believe with me, that it is equally abſurd and contradictious, to aſſert more than One infinitely powerful Being, as to aſſert more than One ſelf-exiſtent Being: Nay, amongſt the Trinitarians, there is one, a late eminent and worthy Writer; who in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, p. 652. l. 19. teaches thus: 'The genuine Attributes of the Deity, namely, ſuch as are demonſtrable of an abſolutely perfect Being, 'are not only not contradictious, but 'alſo neceſſarily connected together, 'and inſeparable from one another. 'For there could not poſſibly be one 'Thing infinite in Wiſdom only, 'another Thing infinite only in Power, and another Thing only infinite in Duration, or eternal; but 'the very ſame Thing which is infinite in Wiſdom, muſt needs be 'alſo infinite in Power, and infinite 'in Duration. That which is infinite in any one Perfection, muſt 'needs have all Perfections in it. 'Thus are all the Perfections of the 'Deity, not only not contradictious, 'but alſo inſeparably concatenate. In the very next Page Dr. *Cudworth* farther aſſerts, 'That there is nothing 'in the genuine Idea of God, and his 'Attributes, but what is demonſtrable of a perfect Being, and that 'there cannot be the leaſt either added to that Idea, or detracted from 'it, any more than there can be any 'thing added to, or detracted from 'the Idea of a Triangle, or of a Square.' Whence it follows unavoidably, that the Son and H. Spirit can no more be omnipotent than ſelf-exiſtent, independent, and firſt Originals; if they have one infinite Perfection, they have all; if they want one, they want all: and if Three diſtinct Beings have each of them all infinite Perfections, they are Three Gods in the higheſt Senſe.

Prop. 11. *It ſeems evident from H. Scripture, that the Son and H. Spirit have all Divine Perfections but thoſe two, ſuch as unlimited Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and unſpotted Purity.* Here his Lordſhip notes, that in my Animadverſions I ſaid, *Unſpotted Purity was but the Perfection of a Man or Angel, not an infinite Perfection of a God.* And here I ſay again, notwithſtanding what he has ſaid to the contrary, that even Saints made perfect, and Angels that never fell from their bleſſed Eſtate, are unſpottedly pure; he will not deny it, and yet they are not Gods: he will not aſſert that they are, and therefore unſpotted Purity is the Perfection of Saints and Angels, not the infinite Perfection of a God. As to his Reproach, ſo frequently caſt upon me, that I have a large Stock of Confidence; I reply, If my Diſcourſe is reaſonable, my Confidence is juſt.

I excepted, as I juſtly might, againſt his Lordſhip's Expreſſion, *It SEEMS evident from Scripture that the Son and H. Spirit have all Perfections but two.* My Reflection, on which he deſcants, but thought not good to ſet down, was this: *That which does but ſeem evident, is not really ſo; and that which is evident, does more than ſeem ſo.* What he excepts, and my Reply thereto, I'm not willing to trouble the Reader with, and therefore I omit it, and proceed.

In my Animadverſions, I wiſh'd he had cited ſome of the plaineſt Texts, from which he thinks the Son and H. Spirit have all Perfections but two. He now has cited; What! plain Texts? no ſuch matter, but naked Texts, without taking notice of the Account already given of them by the Unitarians: and then with a faint ſtroke of Rhetorick, ſays, This Text doth at leaſt *ſeem* to ſpeak Chriſt infinitely powerful, and that *ſeems* to ſpeak him infinitely wiſe, *&c.* But I tell him, no, not one of the Texts alledg'd doth ſo much as *ſeem* to ſpeak his Senſe to an impartial Reader: for ſometimes what he ſuppoſes ſaid of Jeſus Chriſt, is not ſaid of him, but of God his Father; and what is really ſaid of the Lord Chriſt, does only prove him to be more honourable than his Brethren, but ſtill leaves him inferiour to his Father. I will give one Inſtance of each Remark: His Lordſhip affirms, that the Author to the *Hebrews, chap.* 1. *ver.* 10, 11, 12. expreſly applies (he means in the ſtrict literal Senſe) ſome Verſes of the 102*d* Pſalm to the Son of God: I affirm he doth not; To prove my Negative, I premiſe, 1. That thoſe Verſes, if then extant in that Epiſtle, did not ſeem to *Clemens Romanus*, (the moſt antient Father we have) who lived in the firſt Century, to be ſo applied; neither to *Aquina* in the 13*th*, nor to *Deodati* in the laſt Age. The two laſt were Trinitarians. 2. Allowing thoſe Verſes genuine as we have them, the Account given by the Unitarians is moſt agreeable. 3. Setting aſide thoſe two Conſiderations, yet it's moſt manifeſt that the 10*th* Verſe, as applied to the Son of God, was not ſo intended by the Divine Author: for *ver.* 2. the Author ſays, God the Father made the Worlds; and if he ſhould, *v.* 10. aſcribe laying the Foundation of the Heavens and the Earth to the Son, then he contradicts himſelf in the ſame Chapter. If his Lordſhip ſhould ſay the Text tells us, God made the Worlds *by his Son*; I reply, That's not enough for his Hypotheſis; it will not therefore follow that the Son has unlimited Perfections, Infinite Power, *&c.* but rather the contrary.

He cites *Rom.* 9. 5. to prove the Knowledg and Wiſdom of Chriſt to be Infinite, without taking notice of the different Pointings, and conſequently Readings, mentioned by *Eraſmus* and *Curcellæus*; and other Obſervations given in the Anſwer to Mr. *Milbourn:* and beſides, does not fairly read the Text as it is even in our Engliſh Tranſlation. To prove the Power of Chriſt to be limited,

and

and not infinite, I cited *Mat.* 26. 53. where he ſays to *Peter*, *Thinkeſt thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he ſhall preſently give me more than twelve Legions of Angels?* His Lordſhip anſwers, *There's no Neceſſity it ſhould be implied in theſe words, that Chriſt had not Power to deliver himſelf without praying to his Father.* If ſo, would it not then be a Mockery to pray to his Father for that which he had in his own Power before he pray'd for't? He purſues his Anſwer thus: *Greater Works are recorded of Chriſt, without any mention of his praying for Ability to do them.* If I ſtudied to nick him with his own Raillery on me, here I might ask, *Who told him ſo?* and what were thoſe greater Works? It's certain Chriſt had not before he pray'd for it, that Power for which he pray'd. Well! but (ſays his Ldp.) *Chriſt's Power being originally from the Father, he took all Opportunities of giving the Father the Glory of what he did.* If he deſigns this to prove Chriſt's Power *infinite*, he has very ill luck at Argument; for this is a fair and full yielding up the Cauſe. To give Glory to the Father for the Works which he did, ſignifies no leſs than to acknowledg he did them, not by a Power of his own, but by a Power communicated from the Father, and for which he praiſes the Father; which are the Characters of a dependent finite Being. His next Remark is ſtill more againſt himſelf, *viz.* when Chriſt thus ſaid, that he could have obtain'd Legions of Angels by Prayer, *he thought fit to declare in the Ears of his Enemies, how dear he was to God, tho' they hated him.* The dearer one is to God, the greater muſt be his Power; but he that is deareſt, acts by a borrowed Power; and that may perhaps be greater than we can imagine, but cannot be infinite. To rivet his Pleadings againſt himſelf, he is pleas'd to add, that *Chriſt did induſtriouſly conceal the higheſt Senſe in which he was the Son of God.* This is a moſt weak Conceit; and if *Chryſoſtom* was the Author of it, his Ldp. is as much beholden to him as *Ajax* was to *Hector* for the Sword wherewith he ſtabb'd himſelf. If Chriſt conceal'd the higheſt Senſe wherein he was the Son of God, then it is very diſingenuouſly done of the Trinitarians to pretend to prove that higheſt Senſe from any Words of Chriſt; and if the Words of Chriſt do not deliver that Senſe, I am afraid it will be found, that the Apoſtles did as induſtriouſly conceal it as their Maſter; for the Words of Chriſt are indeed ſtrain'd when interpreted this way, but not more than the Words of the Apoſtles for the ſame Purpoſe. And if Chriſt conceal'd that higheſt Senſe from his Enemies, he alſo conceal'd it from all others; for thoſe Diſcourſes which were induſtriouſly fram'd to conceal it from Men not diſpos'd to believe it, could not ſufficiently reveal it to Men diſpos'd to believe it.

Prop. 12. *It's intolerable Preſumption to conclude*, &c. Here his Ldp. is pleas'd to diſown the Grammatical and Natural Signification of his Cenſure,

ſure, in that angry Phraſe *intolerable Preſumption:* He does not mean by it a Preſumption that ſhould not be tolerated. But if I let him take ſanctuary in his Meaning, it ſhall be upon condition, that he will excuſe my having diſplay'd the odious Conſequences of his Words taken in their proper Signification. By *intolerable Preſumption*, he meant a moſt high Preſumption; and he will ſtill ſay, that to conclude, *there is no way of being immediately from God but by Creation, is a wonderful Boldneſs.* I will leave it with the Reader, whether it be not a greater Boldneſs for any Man to determine, there is a way of being immediately from God, beſides by Creation, when neither do the Scriptures ſpeak of, nor can the Reaſon of Man apprehend any ſuch; which tho' he does not poſitively determine, yet he builds upon it. I admire and honour him, that he would not perſecute when it was in his Power. I had affirmed, that neceſſary Emanation was a thing whereof we have no Idea; which not being able to deny, he asks, *Is it impoſſible for a thing to be whereof we have no Idea? Is God bound to give us Idea's, of what he can or has produc'd?* I anſwer to the firſt, It is poſſible. To the ſecond, God is not bound to give us Idea's of what he can or has produc'd; but then we are no ways concern'd, nor can we reaſon or diſcourſe about thoſe things whereof we have no Idea's: Therefore it's high Preſumption to affirm *this* or *that* concerning them; but to impoſe ſuch Affirmations on the Faith of others, is the raging Madneſs of a perſecuting Spirit, which it is the Honour of his Ldp. to deteſt. But what he ſeem'd but juſt now afraid to aſſert, here he makes no Scruple to aſſert: *We have* (ſays he) *a clearer Idea of neceſſary Emanation than of voluntary Creation.* Of voluntary Creation we have this Idea: God of his own Free-will, and by his Almighty Power, did out of nothing bring into being all things that now are. His Ldp. underſtands the Terms, and believes the thing: Let him, if he can, tell me as diſtinctly what Idea he has of *neceſſary Emanation.* Will he explain it by *eternal Proceſſion?* I reply, That which was from all Eternity cannot be imagined to proceed from another, without reverſing the certain fixt Senſe of words. He ſays, that *neceſſary Emanation is the Word of the Fathers, and a better cannot be found out, to expreſs what is intended by it:* and I tell him, no Man could ever yet intelligibly declare, what is intended by it. His Ldp. bids as fair as any Man for it, when he calls it *a more excellent Way of exiſtence than by Creation*; which, till it be explained, how ſhall we judg whether it be ſo or no? If there be, which I know not; there may be for ought he knows, a more proper Phraſe for it.

P. 27. his Ldp. quotes Lines from my MS. Papers; he quotes right, but I omitted two words, I would have that Period read thus: *That ſome-*

ſome thing ſhould NECESSARILY *and* ETERNALLY *come from God, which wants ſome Perfection that God has, is* A. T's *prodigious Suppoſition, under the Name of Neceſſary Emanation.* Now whereas I endeavoured to diſplay the Abſurdity and Impoſſibility of this in ſome few Queſtions, his Ldp. ſeems to agree with much of what I would infer; only merrily taxes me for giving Reaſons for things ſo plain they need none: which is a mortifying Stroke to me; for he takes ſuch care of giving no Reaſons for what he ſays, that I ſhall never have an Opportunity to be reveng'd on him. But in the Concluſion of the Page he tells me it is Nonſenſe to talk of *God's begetting infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs:* I grant it, juſt ſuch Non-ſenſe as it is to talk of *begetting an infinitely powerful, wiſe, and good Being.*

As for his Lordſhip's metaphyſical Diſtinction of *Priority of Time, and Priority of Nature* whereby he would defend his *13th Prop.* 'tis a dark Riddle, and a tempting Subject for Sarcaſm: but out of Reverence to his Ldp. all I ſhall ſay is, that it is a Diſtinction that can explain nothing, nor can any one explain *that.* We know what's meant by Priority of *Time,* and Priority of *Excellence*; if Priority of *Nature* be neither of theſe, 'tis an empty word, deviſ'd, I believe, with a bad Deſign; but us'd now by thoſe that are themſelves deceiv'd by it.

P. 30. his Ldp. is pleas'd to undertake the Defence of an Inſtance: *Which,* he ſays, *he gave in this mention'd Prop. of an Effect every whit as old as the Cauſe of it*; namely, of the Sun the cauſe of Light: In which, if there be any Poſſibility of Truth, then we muſt add new Significations to words, and acutely diſtinguiſh between *Cauſes,* by the Force of which other things are effected, and *Cauſes* which have no Cauſality in them; between *Effects* which are effected by their *Cauſes,* and Effects that are ſelf-exiſtent. For that 2 and 2 make 4, is not more evident, than that Cauſes, by the force of which other things are effected, are older than their Effects; and that Effects that are effected by their Cauſes, are later than their Cauſes. He may as well make one and the ſame Body, to exiſt in more places than one, at one and the ſame time. Thus Miracles are confined to no particular Church nor Age; only there is this Difference, Chriſt and the Apoſtles wrought *Miracles* to confirm their *Doctrines,* but with the modern Teachers the *Doctrines* themſelves are the *Miracles.* To what I objected againſt this his coexiſting Cauſe and Effect, the Sun and its Light, he gives me an Anſwer he meant for facetious: He could *find in his Heart to grant me, that the Sun was* not *the Cauſe of that Light, which was created before the Sun.* I thank him: But upon ſecond Thoughts he will not grant me *that,* l. 23. No, not for all the Book of *Geneſis:* He might have ſpar'd the Book of *Geneſis*; he may uſe me as he pleaſes. He knows the

Sun is the Cauſe of Light by his Eye-ſight: He might as well ſay, His Head is the Cauſe of his Heel by his Feeling. I ſay, the Sun and Light, which together *began to be*, could not one be the Cauſe of the other; but God the Cauſe of both, at the ſame time, and in the ſame manner of Cauſality. His Lordſhip quotes a Scrap from my Papers, and makes me, by mangling my words, talk Contradictions: but my reaſoning was, what I have ſaid, that if the *Sun* and *Light* did begin to exiſt in the ſame Point of Time, then the one cannot be the Cauſe of the other; for that thing which is the Cauſe of another, muſt be in reſpect of time before that other whereof it is the Cauſe.

That I may not omit any thing his Lordſhip thinks material, I am oblig'd to take notice, that in his firſt Defence of his *Propoſitions*, p. 19. he tells the Reader, *His Explication ſpeaks as great an Unity between them* [the Perſons.] *as is between the Sun and its Splendor, and the Light of both.* Which in very plain Engliſh, ſounds thus; between the Sun and its Light, the Light of the Sun, and the Light of the Sun's Light. But that he may not pretend I miſrepreſent him, let the Reader take his Diſcovery in his own Terms; 1. Here's the Sun, 2. The Splendour of the Sun, 3. The Light of the Sun, 4. The Light of the Sun's Splendour. After the Reader has mus'd a while on the diſtinct parts of his Lordſhip's Similitude, let me recal to his Mind his Lordſhip's Notion of One God abſolutely perfect in the higheſt Senſe; and of Two, each of which is God, but not abſolutely perfect in the higheſt Senſe, yet as abſolutely perfect in a lower Senſe as two, each of which is God, can be; who are not abſolutely God in the higheſt Senſe: and then let me ask, whether there is any thing in any other Hypotheſis more apt to make Sport for Hereticks? In truth, had I not a greater Reverence for his Lordſhip's *Vertue* than his *Reaſoning*, I ſhould not ſlip the Occaſion of diverting my Friend.

Whereas I have told him, that the two Propoſitions he boaſts of, for contradicting Arianiſm and Socinianiſm, do alſo contradict ſome of their fellow-Propoſitions; I now prove it by Induction: If the Son and H. Spirit do neceſſarily and eternally exiſt, then they are as ſelf-exiſtent, as independent, as pure Originals as God the Father; if they neceſſarily and eternally exiſt, then the Father as much emanates from, and depends upon them, as they emanate from, and depend upon him; ſo that his Hypotheſis does not more contradict Arianiſm and Socinianiſm, than it contradicts it ſelf. Heatheniſh Doctrines by their Inconſiſtency, meet the Fate of *Rome* Heathen; *ſuis & ipſa Roma viribus ruit.* I may now tell his Ldp. he has no way to expoſe me but by expoſing my Argument: but it's much eaſier to play with Expreſſions by chance ambiguous, than to anſwer Arguments.

Upon my Remark to his 15 *Prop.* he

he asks, *Who are they that determine any Notion to be true, while they cannot conceive it to be ſo?* Why, Sir, in general they are the Trinitarians, but in particular and more eſpecially his Ldp. he is the Man; for does he not expreſly determine in this very *Prop.* that *there is an unconceivably cloſe Union between them* [the ſuppoſed 3 Perſons?] Therefore unleſs he can conceive an unconceivable Notion, or doubt of that which he determines to be true, he is notoriouſly guilty of determining that Notion to be true which he cannot conceive to be ſo. I grant him, there may be a ſtricter Union between God and Chriſt than we know of; but here I am bold and fixt, there can be no ſuch Union between them, as contradicts the Notions he has implanted in us. According to him, the 3 Perſons are 3 diſtinct Beings, and there can be no diſtinct Being without its diſtinct Nature; ſo 3 diſtinct Beings are 3 diſtinct Natures, and 3 diſtinct Natures continuing ſo, can never become one ſingle Nature: what Union ſoever there is between them, I wonder the Trinitarians ſhould ſo conſtantly amuſe their Readers with that unſutable Compariſon of *Soul* and *Body* in Union; for 'tis plain, that in their Union, they are that one thing which neither of them can be in a State of Separation.

Prop. 16. 'Such an Union as this 'between them being acknowledg'd 'by us, together with the fore-men-'tioned intire Dependence of the 'Son and H. Spirit upon the Father, 'the Unity of the Deity is as fully to 'all Intents and Purpoſes aſſerted by 'us as it is neceſſary or deſirable it 'ſhould be.] The End for which the Unity of the Deity was ever aſſerted: What does he mean by this very odd Phraſe? My Senſe is, that it's aſſerted becauſe it is true; and that the Conſequence of its being true, is this; the Service of our whole Hearts is therefore due to him alone, and our lower Reſpects to other Objects, according as his Word, and our own Reaſon directs us: but we cannot both to God and Chriſt pay the Service of our whole Hearts, notwithſtanding their Union in *Will* and *like Natures:* For if we love one Maſter with our whole Hearts, we have no Affections left for any other, but as he ſhall direct us; and he cannot direct us to love another equally with himſelf. Unity of Nature, or 3 Beings united in 1 Nature, is no better nor worſe than 3 Beings in 1 Being, 3 Natures in 1 Nature, 3 and not 3 in the ſame reſpect, which is a Contradicton if any thing be ſo.

Upon his 17 *Prop.* I had told him he was an *Iſmaelite Trinitarian*, whoſe Hand is againſt all the Heads of Trinitarian Expoſitors. To this he replies, *'Tis falſe.* But ſince he deals ſo bluntly with me, I will, 1. Set down ſome of his Contradictions, not conſequential, but broad Contradictions. 2. Not to be wanting in the leaſt to the Vindication of my Cenſure, I will plainly ſhow, that I ſaid no worſe of his Lordſhip upon the account of his Hypotheſis, than he

himſelf had ſaid before of himſelf.

The firſt of his 28 Prop. is this, *The Name of GOD is uſed in more Senſes than one in H. Scripture:* but in his firſt Def. p. 23. ſpeaking of Perfections neceſſary to eſſentiate *a God* in the *abſolutely higheſt Senſe*, he has theſe words; *Which the Name of God is ever to be underſtood in in the H. Scripture.* In the ſame Def. p. 17. he affirms, that *H. Script. ſaith not of what Nature that Unity is, which it aſcribes to God.* But *Prop.* 13. of the 28. he ſays, *The Oneneſs ſo frequently affirmed of him in Script. is a numerical Oneneſs.* In his ſecond Def. p. 13. he ſays, *The individual Nature of the Father is not a Divine Nature more truly than that of the Two other Perſons.* But *Prop.* 15. he ſays, *Each of them has a Right to the Name of God, in a Senſe next to that, in which it is appropriated to the Father.* This Contradiction he is in love with, it often occurs. *P.* 10. of 2*d* Def. diſtinguiſhing between Perfections which he makes to belong to the *Father's Exiſtence*, and Perfections which belong to his Divine *Nature* or *Eſſence*, he contends that the Son and H. Spirit have all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, as well as the Father: But *p.* 23. of firſt Def. he obſerves, that Athanaſius, *S.* Baſil, Greg. Nazianzen, *and S.* Chryſoſtom, *with ſeveral of the Latin Fathers, interpret thoſe Words of Chriſt, MY FATHER IS GREATER THAN I, to have been ſpoken not of his Humanity, but his Divinity*; and himſelf gives his Judgment to their Sentence. *Prop.* 16. of the 28. he affirms it to be evident from H. Script. that the Son and H. Spirit have unlimited Power, *&c.* which alſo he allows, 2*d* Def. *p.* 10. to be an eſſential Perfection: but 2*d* Def. *p.* 24. he acknowledges that the Power of Judging the World, was a Power committed to Chriſt, not as Man, and not eſſentially in him. *Prop.* 17. he determines, that *they* [the 3 Perſons] *are always ſpoken of in Script. as diſtinct Beings or Perſons, according to the proper Signification of this word, both from the Father and from each other; nor are ſo many Men or Angels more expreſly diſtinguiſhed as different Perſons or Subſtances, by our Saviour or his Apoſtles, than the Father, Son, and H. Ghoſt are.* But 1*ſt* Def. *p.* 20. he ſays, *They are outwardly, and in reference to the Creation, perfectly One and THE SAME God, as concurring in all the ſame external Actions.* I hope the Reader will allow me at leaſt, that theſe Inſtances do ſufficiently prove, that his Lordſhip's Hand is againſt *one of the Heads* of the Trinitarians, I mean himſelf. That it is alſo againſt all the other, he will excuſe me the Labour of proving by a tedious Induction of Particulars; for *Prop.* 17. of the 21. he affirms, that his Explication is the beſt and eaſieſt way of reconciling thoſe Texts; which according to *the other Hypotheſis*, are not reconcilable, but by offering extream Violence to them. Here he prefers his Hypotheſis indefinitely to all other Hypotheſes. Here's no Reſtriction, no Exception.

Nay,

Nay, in the Concluſion he doubts not to pronounce, that the many Explications of the adorable Myſtery, have had little better Succeſs than to make Sport for the Socinians.

My Animadverſion on his 18 Prop. I have a better Opinion of, ſince I ſaw his Anſwer, than when I firſt pen'd them. However, I ſhall examine a few Lines: P. 37. l. 30. *How can he ſay* (ſaith his Ldp.) *that Jeſus Chriſt deſir'd not Divine Honours to be paid to him? except he mean it when he was on Earth.* I mean as a plain Reader would imagin, that Chriſt deſired not any Divine Honours to be paid him, either in one State or other; meaning by *Divine Honours* ſuch as are due to him that is by Nature omniſcient, omnipotent, and omnipreſent: but if we mean by *Divine Honours*, ſuch as agree to him that could do nothing of himſelf, that judgeth as he hears, and hath all Judgment committed to him by the Father that ſent him, that all Men ſhould honour the Son even as they honour the Father that ſent him; I agree that ſuch Divine Honour is due to the Son. Divine Honour in the former Senſe, the Son himſelf forbad to be paid him, even after he ſhould leave the World and go to the Father, Joh. 16. 23. *At that day ye ſhall ask me nothing; verily, verily, I ſay unto you, whatſoever ye ſhall ask the Father in my Name he will give it you:* and ver. 26. *At that day ye ſhall ask in my Name.* I think he does not well to take no notice of the Account which the Unitarians give of that Text. Will he build ſo great a Duty as is the worſhipping of another beſides one, with the Worſhip due only to the One God, upon the Interpretation of the Particle *as*; which, he cannot deny, does in ſeveral places of Scripture import, not an Equality in the things ſpoken of, not the juſt Meaſure and Nature of the Duty enjoin'd, but the Neceſſity of it, and ſome Similitude, which it bears to what was beforementioned? To love our Neighbour *as* our ſelf, is not to be underſtood equally with our ſelf; for that is impoſſible, and contrary to the very Principles of Humane Nature; for *omnes ſibi melius eſſe malle quam alteri:* but we ſhould do the one *as certainly* as we do the other. It is but juſt and equal, that the great and only God be honoured with all the Powers and Faculties of our reaſonable Natures; and that Jeſus Chriſt be honoured with an Honour next to that. He ſaith, Chriſt is not God in the higheſt Senſe; therefore ſay I, the higheſt Honour is not to be paid him.

I ſaid upon his 19th Prop. *that the Socinians are not willing to confeſs, that the Honour of the Father is as much taken care of in his Explication, as they do wiſh it were.* He anſwers, Sure they will not ſay, that their own Hypotheſis doth give more Honour to the Father, than *THAT* which ſpeaks him the Author of *all* that the other Perſons either *have* or *are*. I reply, Yes, they will; becauſe it's more honour to be the *voluntary* Author of what the Son and H. Spirit *have* and *are*, (as the Unitarians hold) than

to

to be the neceſſary Author [or indeed no Author] as his Ldp. holds.

Upon my ſaying, that it is not our Duty to think as honourably as we can of any Perſon, but God the Father Almighty; his Lordſhip anſwers, He meant by *as honourably as POSSIBLY we can*, as honourably as *LAWFULLY* we can. Dr. *S--th* made Dean *Sherlock* pay dear for this Evaſion; but I will not write after that furious Example, preſerving my Reſpects to his Lordſhip: All I ſay is, His Ldp. is a well-meaning Man; and in 20 other places, where his Words ſound tritheiſtically, and contradictorily, I believe he meant honeſtly.

P. 40. From that Text, *I will not give my Glory to another*, his Lordſhip argues, that the Son of God is not a Creature; as if God had ſaid, I will give my Glory to no other but my Son: But it's a plain and good Conſequence, This, [taking the Words in an univerſal Senſe] becauſe God will not give his Glory to another; therefore no other, no not the Son, is to be worſhipped with that Honour which is due to the Father.

As to my Animadverſion on his 20*th* Prop. he appeals to you, my Friend, to judg. Every Man that reads will judg, and ſome will be biaſs'd by one Prejudice, and ſome by another; and ſome may chance to examine diligently, to conſider freely, and to judg impartially: among this latter ſort of Readers, I fancy I may have the moſt Friends; but the other I fear are all his.

Prop. 21. he ſays, *His Explication agrees well with that of the Nicene Fathers and* Athanaſius.] I grant it of what ſome of them have ſaid in divers places of their Works, concerning the Trinity: but it's nevertheleſs true, that in other places it diſagrees with what that Council and Saint have taught. For you muſt know, Sir, that even *they* are not all of a piece; but ſometimes Orthodox, ſometimes Heterodox; and often need the Aſſiſtance of a candid Reader, to interpret them according to a pretended ſound Meaning, quite contrary to the Grammatical Senſe of their words. As for his agreeing with them, I wonder which of the Antients ever taught, *That 2 Beings which depend on God, are as almighty as the God on whom they and all things depend:* I wonder which of the Antients found out the two Senſes; in one of which, *the Son and H. Ghoſt were each of them eſſentially God, and in the other not.* I queſtion whether there be any ſuch Stuff among the School-men; but if he can produce me the Father who has fallen into this particular Weakneſs; that, *Tho' the Name of God is us'd in more Senſes than one in H. Script. yet the Name of GOD in H. Script. is always to be underſtood in the higheſt Senſe*; I will never queſtion but he has Antiquity on his ſide, whether any Truth and Senſe or no.

As for his Compliment, that *he knows not whether there be more of Arrogance than Ignorance, or Ignorance than Arrogance in the Remark*, about Credit from the Judgment of the

the Antient Fathers; it looks as if it was borrowed from Dr. *S--th*, it has the Air of his impatient Opiniativeneſs, but does not at all become the better Nature of the Bp. of *Gloceſter*. But *he finds I am a ſort of an Adverſary, that would not permit him to treat me otherwiſe*. And how did I compel him to treat me (as he ſuſpects he has done) with too much Freedom? Why! I took a Liberty with him: But, Sir, you can aſſure him, that when I compos'd my MS. I knew not who was the Author of the 21 Propoſitions, and could not dream they ſhould have been printed: my Aim was only to let you (then my very new Acquaintance) privately know my private Judgment. I am none of your Proſelyte, nor no Man's elſe. I profeſs ſincerely, I fell into what I hold touching the Trinity, by freely thinking and ſeriouſly conſidering, what I occaſionally met with, here and there, now and then.

To conclude, I thank his Lordſhip for his good Wiſhes; and I do really believe, now he has vented his Anger, that he is ſincere in them: for which I make him this Return: I heartily wiſh all Good to him, as I ought upon many Accounts; 1. In general, becauſe he is a very worthy and good Man. 2. In particular, becauſe he hates Perſecution. 3. Becauſe he has not only ſworn to the Government, but looks upon King *William*, who gave him his Preferment, as our Deliverer, not Conqueror; our juſt and lawful King, and no Uſurper. But I cannot thank him for his Advice: *He would have me think it poſſible, that thoſe Opinions, which I take for moſt evident, and moſt neceſſary Truths, may be groſs and dangerous Errors.* Why! my Opinion is, that the Being of God, and the Reaſonableneſs of H. Religion, are moſt evident and neceſſary Truths; and no Man living ſhall perſwade me to that Modeſty, as to think it poſſible for theſe to be groſs and dangerous Errors. Again; He would have me believe that I may be mightily miſtaken, when I am moſt confident: Indeed this Piece of Advice has not ſo ill a face as the other, but his Lordſhip might have ſpar'd it; for I will not be moſt confident, but when the Truth is moſt plain and evident. I am, Sir, Yours.

FINIS.